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Abstract 
Municipal police boards in Canada serve an important function as they strive to mediate 
competing but compatible notions of police accountability and police independence; doctrines 
essential to a liberal democracy. There is considerable variation in the structure of Canadian 
police boards and this major paper examines their relationship with police independence. 
Through an empirical survey of Canadian municipal police chiefs that report to a police 
board, this pan-Canadian study is the first of its kind in more than 20 years. The findings 
refuted any significant relationship between police board structure and police independence, 
and offered a generally positive outlook on the current state of police governance in Canada. 
However, the results also suggested a persistence of political interference and pressure in 
policing revealing serious blind spots in police governance. The research findings presented in 
this major paper were contextualized through a comprehensive review of relevant literature 
and offer a timely contribution to the paucity of knowledge surrounding police governance in 
Canada today.  
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Introduction 
 1
Under the rubric of a Westminster political system, police must be subject to 
ministerial responsibility. Yet, as a central principle of democracy, the police must be 
independent of political interference. An historical review of police/state relations and, in 
particular, Canadian commissions of inquiry, reveal that the seemingly dichotomous doctrines 
of police accountability to the state and autonomy from the state present an enduring and 
vexing challenge. History provides several examples of attempts to use police as a political 
apparatus, yet “there exists an equally unsettling history of police agencies acting as a law 
unto themselves” (Sossin, 2004: 30-31). How to guard against one extreme while not inviting 
the other is a balancing act for police boards. Fundamental to the legitimacy of police and 
state control in a liberal democracy, police boards in Canada serve an important function as 
they strive to simultaneously facilitate police accountability and police independence.  
 As a central figure in the network of regulatory bodies and processes which mediate a 
complex and delicate relationship between the state and police, municipal police boards 
govern most municipal police services in Canada today. Consequently, these boards are 
responsible for governing a significant portion of Canada’s human and financial police 
resources. In 2007, there were more than 200 municipal police services employing nearly 
59% (37,615 police officers1) of Canadian police officers (Canadian Centre for Justice 
Statistics, 2007). In 2006, total policing expenditures were estimated at $9.9 billion, which 
represented a cost of $303 per Canadian (Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, 2007). The 
challenges facing police boards are, therefore, of critical importance democratically and 
economically. Empowered by a provincial police act, boards are typically responsible for 
directing policy, hiring the chief constable, and managing the police budget; the largest 
operational expenditure of most cities.   
                                                 
1 Represents actual police officer strength as of May 15, 2007. 
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Police governance in Canada enjoys a rich and well-documented history spanning 150 
years. Boards were established to provide essential guidance to the administration of police, 
while removing the political favouritism and control of ward aldermen which dominated 
police departments at the time (Fosdick 1969; as cited in Stenning, 1992). Canadian police 
boards have experienced substantial changes to their membership and authority since 1858 
(Biro, 2006). Although there is considerable variation in the structure of Canadian police 
boards today, the fundamental mandate of the board to affect the competing but compatible 
principles of police accountability and police independence remain intact.  
Despite an historical persistence of political interference in policing, as evidenced by 
numerous commissions of inquiry, all boards have retained seemingly political structures. In 
many instances, boards appear structurally as another ‘committee of council’ with local 
council members forming the board or occupying a majority of positions including that of 
chair/vice-chair. In almost all cases, city council is responsible for appointing and terminating 
some or all citizen board members and approving the police budget. Consequently, elected 
officials are powerfully positioned to control a board’s structure and influence its outcomes. 
In the extreme, the unfettered control of a police board provides an opportunity for elected 
officials to influence or interfere with the police service through the chief constable. Although 
evidence of such behaviour exists, it is mostly anecdotal and its prevalence is entirely 
unknown. Moreover, any relationship that may exist between these incidents and the 
involvement of city council in the police board is unclear and empirically untested.  
Theoretical Assumptions in Police Governance 
 
Central to the policy of municipal police governance are at least three theoretical 
assumptions. The first assumption is that police require governance. This assumption is 
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premised on the belief that without governance, police will act as a law unto themselves. In a 
democratic society, the legitimacy of police rule relies on the permission of the public which, 
in turn, demands control of coercive power and authority of police. In effect, police 
governance serves the function of oversight to ensure police control and accountability. The 
second assumption is that the state is not a legitimate agent for ensuring adequate and 
appropriate governance of police. The underlying fear is that the awesome power and 
authority of police may be misappropriated by the state if it has direct and complete control 
over police. The ensuing assumption is that another body, or combination of mechanisms, is 
necessary to ensure that police power is appropriately controlled, yet safeguarded from 
political interference or misappropriation. The third assumption inherent in the policy of 
police governance is that the structure and processes of modern police boards in Canada 
sufficiently serve the intended purpose of ensuring that police are both accountable and 
independent. The latter assumption, in part, is the subject of interest here.  
Hypothesis 
 
Given the diversity of police boards, it is possible that certain board structures may be 
inherently more political than others. As such, there may exist an inverse relationship between 
how politically structured a board appears and how independent the corresponding police 
service is. Consequently, the hypothesis of this study was that the more inherently political a 
police board structure, as defined by its size, composition, appointment processes, and 
particularly the ratio, role, and rights of elected officials on the board, the less independent 
the police service would be from the perspective of the chief constable. In tangible terms, it 
was hypothesized that a police board with a majority of municipally elected officials who 
occupied the executive positions with full voting rights and who were responsible for 
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appointing all citizen board members would result in a less independent police service as 
reported by the police chief. This hypothesis was tested through a comprehensive survey of all 
municipal police chiefs reporting to a police board in Canada.  
Agency and Stewardship Theory 
 
According to Hillman and Dalziel, “boards of directors serve two important functions 
for organizations: monitoring management on behalf of shareholders and providing 
resources” (2003: 383). From a macro-theoretical perspective of corporate governance, 
agency theory offers the most dominant theoretical framework (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella Jr, 
2003). According to Lynall, Golden, and Hillman (2003), agency theory is premised on the 
separation between ownership (shareholders) and control (management). “Agency theorists 
view executives as self-serving and opportunistic” (Daily et al., 2003: 372).  
For agency theorists, the board of directors serves to monitor managers on behalf of 
shareholders, and board independence, defined as the degree to which board members are 
dependent on the current CEO or organization, is considered a key to successful board 
monitoring (Prevost, Rao, & Hossain, 2002). Another key to effective monitoring, according 
to agency theory, is a board's incentive (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). The ability of 
shareholders to closely monitor managers, however, is “limited by the free rider problem, 
where a single shareholder bears the full costs of monitoring but receives only a pro-rated 
proportion of the benefits” (Prevost et al., 2002: 731).  
In the case of police board members, the benefits derived from performing their duties 
are often not financial or tangible. Instead, most balance a full-time job with their board 
responsibilities, which often require 30 or more hours monthly. Although some boards 
provide a small honorarium to members, others rely exclusively on the goodwill of 
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volunteers. The incentive to monitor management is often internally driven and, for those 
whom the path of least resistance is preferred, motivation may be minimal, especially when 
faced with the “us and them” mentality that defines police culture (Reiner, 1992).  
Extending this theory, board dependence, defined as the degree to which insiders and 
outsiders with ties to the current CEO or organization dominate the board, is another 
important consideration (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Boards consisting primarily of insiders 
or dependent outside directors are considered less effective at monitoring because of their 
dependence on the organization (Lynall et al., 2003). In contrast, independent boards, or those 
consisting primarily of independent outside directors, are thought to be the most effective at 
monitoring. Accordingly, from an agency theory perspective, “board composition primarily 
concerns the development of independent boards or otherwise aligning the interests of 
directors with those of shareholders to ensure effective monitoring of management” (Lynall et 
al., 2003: 417). Critics of agency theory suggest that it focuses too much on board incentives 
to monitor or control management and too little on the board’s ability, such as its expertise, 
experience, and ties to strategically relevant organizations (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003).  
 Taking another theoretical perspective, stewardship theory does not view executives as 
entirely self-serving and opportunistic. Instead, stewardship theorists view executives as 
“frequently having interests that are isomorphic with those of shareholders” (Daily et al., 
2003: 375). This is not to suggest that executives are altruistic, but rather that there are many 
situations in which serving shareholders' interests also serves their own interests (Lane, 
Cannella, & Lubatkin, 1998; cited in Daily et al., 2003). Similarly, resource dependent 
theorists assert that a board’s internal resources, or capital, are more significant than a board’s 
incentive to monitor effectively (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). As with all theories derived 
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from the business management private sector, one must exercise some caution in generalizing 
to public sector executives and public boards.  
 In order to study the relationship between board structure and board independence, 
this major paper is organized into four chapters. Chapter One provides a comprehensive and 
broad review of the research literature relevant to police governance, with particular attention 
to the factors comprising police board structures. Chapter Two outlines the methodology of 
this study including an overview of key choices made in the research process, as well as 
detailed accounts of the processes implemented. Chapter Three provides a summative and 
evaluative report of the research results. Chapter Four summarizes this major research project, 
considers policy and legislative implications, and provides recommendations to further 
explore, debate, and/or address the actual or perceptual challenges of police governance in 
Canada.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter One: Literature Review  
 This chapter is organized to provide a comprehensive review of the research literature. 
An historical, theoretical, and legal examination of the relationship between the state and 
police in a democratic society is fundamental to this subject. Accordingly, a brief historical 
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overview of policing demonstrates the early roots of politicization as well as the evolution of 
police boards in Canada. This review is followed by a theoretical perspective of crime and 
politics through a discussion on democratic policing, legitimacy and consent, and police 
authority. The chapter also includes a description of the constitutional and legal frameworks 
that influence the politics and governance of policing in Canada today. It examines the 
doctrines of, and relationship between, police independence and accountability. Expanding on 
the historical rationalization for both principles, an overview of Canadian commissions of 
inquiry into police/government interactions over the past 30 years is included. The chapter 
concludes with literature specific to the variables which comprise police board structures in 
this study.2    
Policing: A Political History 
 
In the earliest documented days of “informal” policing in Britain, citizens policed 
themselves. Later, appointed citizen volunteers apprehended wrongdoers and citizens 
organized themselves to patrol at night (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990). Throughout this 
period, from the 14th century until the early 19th century, a form of police governance and 
oversight rested with appointed Justices of the Peace (Stenning, 1996). This model was 
consistent with most common law jurisdictions wherein the responsibility for public police 
services was regarded as a local concern to be fulfilled through locally-controlled institutions 
(Biro, 2006).  
                                                 
2 Although a review of the literature revealed considerable commentary about police governance, empirical 
research is conspicuously absent. Instead, the literature is parochial, descriptive, and functional, dominated by 
opinion-based reports, academic debate, anecdotal evidence, and unreliable media accounts. While there is 
considerable literature about board governance generally, and about governance structures and processes 
specifically, it exists within the confines of business management. The transferability of this literature to a public 
sector board and police boards, in particular, is questionable. Although this literature is reviewed here, its 
limitations are explicitly noted. 
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By the mid 1820s, the need for a full-time paid police force became evident. Sir 
Robert Peel, the Home Secretary, was charged with the political task of establishing the 
London Metropolitan Police Force in 1829. In doing so, he established his now oft-cited 
principles of policing which recognized, among other things, the source and importance of 
police legitimacy. He asserted that “the power of the police to fulfill their functions and duties 
is dependent on public approval of their existence, actions and behaviour, and on their ability 
to secure and maintain public respect” (Pue, 2000: 86). 
According to Radzinowicz, the London Police was “an hierarchical, bureaucratic 
organization…commanded by two appointed commissioners (who were also Justices of the 
Peace)…accountable directly to the Home Secretary, a cabinet minister in the elected central 
government” (as cited in Stenning, 1996: 17). This organizational model was also adopted for 
Canadian municipal police forces during the 19th century. Gradually, municipal councils 
assumed the responsibility of the Justices of the Peace and supervised the police forces. In 
most instances, the municipalities delegated authority to a “police committee” of council 
comprised of the mayor and other elected or appointed officials.  
It is apparent from all accounts of policing history that the elected governors of the 
day were not preoccupied with the establishment of an apolitical police force. Kelling and 
Moore (1988) subdivided the history of policing into three eras: political; reform; and 
community problem-solving. Although the years assigned to each era are debated among 
academics, general agreement exists about the defining features of each.    
Political Era (1840 to early 1900s) 
 
During the political era, police departments were structurally centralized and 
hierarchal, but did not function in this manner. Instead, police officers operated in 
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decentralized wards and communication with headquarters was almost nonexistent. The result 
was an absence of internal supervision and organizational control (Palmiotto, 2000). Local 
governments controlled policing and there was a very close relationship between police and 
politicians. More to the point, politicians directed all police activities (Trojanowicz and 
Bucqueroux, 1990). “It was the ward politician who controlled the police in his neighborhood; 
because job security was not available to ward police officers, they were obligated to the ward 
politicians for their positions” (Palmiotto, 2000: 25). Where detectives existed, they were used 
by politicians usually to obtain information for political purposes. 
Reform Era (early 1900s to early 1970s) 
 
The reform era was characterized as a movement to free police from the control of 
politicians by, among other things, eliminating political patronage in the hiring and firing of 
police personnel. Political influence came to be seen as “deviant and insidious to effective 
police management” (Palmiotto, 2000: 26). In 1929, Chief August Vollmer led the American 
police reform movement through the establishment of ten principles, which included the 
necessity to eliminate “the corrupting influence of politics” from policing. Vollmer’s 
Principles advocated an independent police chief hired on the basis of merit, decent salaries 
for all officers, accountability through record keeping, and increased supervision through the 
use of communication systems (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990).    
Organizational reform also characterized this era and the goal of administration 
became to “distance the police from the citizens” (Palmiotto, 2000: 27) to avoid the 
corruption seen previously. Accordingly, the mandate of police shifted from a social service 
function to a narrow enforcement-based role (Peak and Glensor, 1999). Random patrol, rapid 
response, and reactive investigation became the primary functions of police (Griffiths, Parent, 
 10
& Whitelaw, 2001). This traditional model of policing3 became synonymous with the reform 
era and, some argue, prevails today. Structurally, police organizations assumed a truly 
centralized, hierarchal, command and control model (Kelling and Moore, 1988). While having 
some success in insulating police from political influence, the distanced relationship between 
the police and the public became problematic.  
In the 1960s and 1970s, police legitimacy was questioned, allegations of racism gave 
rise to riots, and the civil rights movement gained momentum (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 
1990). Simultaneous to these socio-political challenges, crime and fear rapidly increased 
despite significant increases in police budgets. Fiscal challenges at the local level ensued, and 
the public became dissatisfied with the ability of police to control crime (Peak and Glensor, 
1999). The convergence of these issues, capped by an influential indictment of the traditional 
model by Herman Goldstein in 1979, contributed to the end of the reform era and the 
beginning of the community problem-solving era (Palmiotto, 2000). 
 
Community Problem-Solving Era (1970s to present) 
 
 The community problem-solving era, spurred in part by a “growing dissatisfaction 
with traditional police practices and a recognition of their shortcomings” (Rosenbaum and 
Lurigio, 1994b: 299), has remained the officially dominant model of policing (Greene, 2001; 
Griffiths et al., 2001; Kerley and Benson, 2000). Unlike the reform era, this model of policing 
was designed to bring the community and police together through community-police 
partnerships and proactive approaches (Griffiths et al., 2001). Decentralization, flattened 
                                                 
3 The traditional model of policing is also commonly referred to as the “professional” or “bureaucratic” model.   
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hierarchal structure, and a more collaborative community approach characterized this new 
orthodoxy for police (Rosenbaum, 1994a; Sadd and Grinc, 1994).  
 By design, this more complex era of policing produced stronger public interest and 
participation, yet offered little to strengthen or clarify the relationship between police and 
government. Perhaps as a byproduct of a more engaged and attentive citizenry, Canadian 
police have been the subject of five royal commissions of inquiry during the community 
problem-solving era; each an indictment of inadequate police independence or accountability 
and evidence that the struggle to ameliorate the relationship between the state and police 
remains unabated.  
 This brief historical overview of policing reveals a nearly constant role of politics in 
policing. The political era, in particular, historically validates the second assumption of this 
major paper that the power of police may be misappropriated by the state if they are not 
safeguarded from political interference. This assertion is further supported through a review 
of recent commissions of inquiry. While public pressure to insulate police from politicization 
brought an end to the political era, it was also a dissatisfied and disenfranchised public that 
brought an end to the reform era. In both instances, change occurred in response to a 
perceptual failure of the system which problematized and politicized crime control.   
Crime and Politics: A Theoretical Perspective 
 
 According to Bayley, “one cannot explain contemporary police systems without 
becoming involved in an exploration of political development” (1970: 100). Today, it appears 
widely and increasingly accepted in the literature that police and crime are inherently political 
(Bayley, 1970; Estrada, 2004; Goldsmith, 1991; Haggerty, 2004). It is politically 
advantageous for crime to be cast as a problem to be solved through effective political action 
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amidst an environment where “nobody (politicians) can afford to be viewed as being ‘soft on 
crime’” (Estrada, 2004: 421). Still, there is an apparent “shift toward a more visceral politics, 
to the point that rationalist strategies are increasingly marginalized” (Haggerty, 2004: 221). 
The net result is a displacement of criminological experts in favour of those who are more 
politically-savvy. According to Garland,  
 …crime policy has ceased to be a bipartisan matter that can be devolved to 
professional experts and has become a prominent issue in electoral 
competition. Policy measures are constructed in ways that appear to value 
political advantage and public opinion over the views of experts and evidence 
of research (2001: 13). 
 
 Perhaps as a natural consequence to the politicization of crime over the last 30 years, 
what constitutes criminality has become apparently more diffuse. Clarifying what the problem 
is, what the solutions are, and whose responsibility it is remains elusive. “The discourse of 
crime control seems to combine incompatible specifications of the problem, and politicians 
and professionals cycle rapidly through the different options” (Rose, 1999: 239). Further, 
there has been a net widening effect of what is the responsibility of police and the criminal 
justice system, yet an understanding of the capacity of these institutions to manage new forms 
of crime is apparently absent. As a result, proposals stressing the need for individuals and 
communities to take more responsibility coexist with proposals for more policing. Osborne 
and Gaebler (1992, cited in Johnston and Shearing, 2003) referred to this as government 
retaining responsibility for ‘steering’ and the citizenry retaining responsibility for ‘rowing’. 
Rose (1996) referred to this as governing at a distance.  
 In this model of government, individuals become “guided by new forms of expertise 
that exist outside of the state apparatus” (Pratt, 1999: 145). Such a revised relationship 
between the state and the people reflects a significant departure from the welfare state. 
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Ironically, while the state’s inability to represent public interests was deemed to be the 
problem 30 years ago, it is now argued that “neo-liberalism has disaggregated the state 
apparatus, depriving it of its capacity to represent ‘public interests’ adequately in a 
fragmented and market-dominated society” (Stenning, 2003: 34). Pratt (1999) noted, 
however, that the state does not relinquish all control and interest, but rather presides over 
these new ways of governing by regulating experts.  
 As a result of significant societal and economic changes, Garland suggested that the 
new politics of crime control were “socially and culturally conditioned and have become 
increasingly more expressive and instrumental” (Garland, 2001: 139). He added that 
contemporary justice policy was “bifurcated by an adaptive strategy characterized by 
community partnership and a sovereign state strategy that stresses coercive control” (2001: 
139). It appears, however, that Garland’s (1996) concept of sovereign crime control - a state 
which is there to provide security, law and order, and crime control - has been replaced by a 
more pluralized nexus of risk management and security agents. This, however, creates a 
predicament for government because, while it has withdrawn as the primary provider of 
security and crime control, it may be expected to retain social control functions. From this 
perspective, it may be argued that police boards are merely a means for government to retain 
control of police and crime, but through a mode that perceptually insulates police from such 
control.  
 It is apparent from the discussion to this point that the relationship between crime and 
politics is historically intimate and evolving. To understand this relationship better and to 
contextualize more fully the relationship between police and the state, it is useful to consider 
the specific role of police in a democracy  
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Democratic Policing 
 
 Although the police are a major nexus between civil society and the state, “democracy 
is not possible unless the police behave democratically” (Marenin, 2000: 317). Indeed, the 
“defining feature of the modern sovereign state is its monopoly of legitimate force; a 
monopoly that is principally vested (in) police” (Loader, 2000: 325). Most democratic 
societies, as Lapkin (1999) points out, have developed professional policing agencies to 
ensure personal and state security, to deal with behaviour that infringes on individual and 
societal rights, and to protect citizens from state and political excesses. Goldstein summarized 
the situation by noting that, while police possess “an awesome power” to disrupt freedom and 
intrude into people’s privacy, “democracy is heavily dependent upon its police…to maintain 
the degree of order that makes a free society possible” (1977: 1). Given the essential role and 
“awesome power” of police to mediate the delicate relationship between the state and civil 
society, the nature of the police relationship with each, and the form in which such mediation 
occurs, is critical to democracy.  
 The relationship between the state and policing is complex and delicate, leaving open 
to debate where one stops and the other starts, if, in fact, they are not one and the same. 
Likewise, the extent to which police are mere actors of the state or apolitical agents in their 
own right is well-contested throughout the literature. Perhaps as a consequence of such 
complexity, Marenin noted that “policing is generally misconceptualized… perceived as done 
by agents of the state, at the behest of those who control the state, with little choice or 
discretion” (2000: 314). Building on this perspective, Brewer, Guelke, Hume, Moxon-
Browne, and Wilford stated: 
To portray public order policing as somehow insulated from political decisions 
about the choice and mix of state strategies to deal with disorder is not only 
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misleading, it also obscures the chain of relations connecting the state, police, 
and society. By the same token, to treat the police as mere ciphers dutifully 
implementing whatever strategy has been arrived at by the state elite is equally 
prone to error and mystification (1988: 233). 
 
While it may be clear that police are neither apolitical nor obedient agents of the state, what 
constructs the relationship remains elusive. Bayley (cited in Marenin, 2000) asserted that it 
was important to understand policing as a “set of order promoting policies, only some of 
which are located in the state and characterized by a monopoly of legitimate force” (1985: 
316). 
 Regardless of one’s understanding, as Wood and MacAlister suggested, recognizing 
the relationship simply as “a balancing act” may be what is ultimately important: 
Police governance in a democratic society, whether this is understood as the 
‘constitutional and institutional arrangements for framing and directing the 
policies of the police’ or as ‘governmental strategies originating from both 
inside and outside the state’, is ultimately a balancing act, requiring the 
delicate handling of a number of competing and conflicting objectives (2005: 
197).  
 
This notion of “a balancing act” is perhaps best for describing the ideal of democratic 
policing. Brogden (1992; cited in Marenin, 2000) suggested that democratic policing balances 
coercion and consent, autonomy, and responsiveness. “On the one hand, police are expected 
to maintain general order and specific behaviour, yet, on the other hand, there is a wish for 
police to protect particular interests and for the state not to interfere in the private lives of its 
citizens” (Brogden, 1992; cited in Marenin, 2000: 312). “The capacity of the police to balance 
these competing values implies and demands discretion and a degree of autonomy for police; 
autonomy which, paradoxically, must be legitimized and consented to by citizens and the 
state” (Marenin, 2000: 312).  
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Legitimacy and Consent 
 
 Policing by consent is widely viewed as essential to democratic policing (Durston, 
2000; Goldsmith, 2005). Yet, the “dilemma of legitimacy plagues no state institution more 
doggedly than the police” (Herbert, 2006: 481). Herbert added that, “as the most visible 
reminder of the state’s coercive power, the police represent both the majesty and potential 
tyranny of state authority” (2006: 481). It follows that self-restraint by state officials and 
particularly the police, given their state-entrusted responsibility for the exercise of coercion, 
“is crucial to the nature of liberal democratic societies” (Goldsmith, 1999: 34).  
 There exists, however, an inherent tension between too little and too much restraint by 
both the state and the police, a tension which “the regulation of control and accountability” 
(Durston, 2000: 245) attempts to reconcile. Building on this, Loader noted that, “we have 
received a set of liberal (and lately neoliberal) discourses and institutional arrangements that 
have as their central preoccupation the precise task of limiting and seeking control of the 
police by means of rendering them accountable through and/or to the mechanism and 
institutions of government” (2000: 325). He added that these means had generally assumed 
one (or some combination) of the following forms: (1) mechanisms of legal restraint and 
redress; (2) a framework of democratic institutions (i.e.: police boards) that the police can be 
required to consult and cooperate with or account and defer to; (3) various internal 
organizational devices that seek to guide the exercise of police discretion; and (4) a set of 
managerialistic tools (i.e.: performance targets) backed up by a regime of audit and 
inspection. It is also widely acknowledged that police today “are governed, or at least 
influenced, by an intricate web of rules and relationships operating at multiple sites including 
the legal, constitutional, political, social, and international” (Martin, 2004: 258). Amidst a 
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backdrop of “liberalism’s suspicion of the exercise of state power” (Goldsmith, 1999: 34), 
how and by whom such a set of rules and regulations is to be implemented is complicated. 
 According to Roach, “the democratic policing model sees ministerial responsibility for 
policing matters as a fundamental feature of responsible government” (2007: 60). However, 
Marenin asserted that: 
The minimum structural and cultural requirement for democratic policing is 
semi-autonomy. Some capacity for discretion…but constrained by 
responsiveness to law, state, and civic society demands is required. Second, the 
police must recognize and accept that their job requires being responsive to 
conflicting demands. The last requirement imposes the most difficult burden 
on democratizing police forces. Having been just liberated from the yoke of 
state and elite control they must now voluntarily submit themselves to external 
control of a different form and see the limits of their autonomy (2000: 325).  
 
 Goldsmith advocated that in a setting where distrust of police and the state may exist, 
“third-party accountability can serve as a ‘circuit breaker’ by establishing a channel for the 
provision of information, influence, and control” (2005: 260). Elsewhere, Goldsmith stated, 
“civilian oversight of police can be seen as a mechanism for pursuing the consent of the 
governed, a “defining ingredient of modern liberal democratic systems” (1999: 37-38).  
Martin affirmed this solution noting that “few dispute the proposition that in a democratic 
society, police must be…accountable to civilian authority and the ‘tool’ of no political 
master” (2004: 258). However, Martin added that police must also be bound by the rule of 
law.  
 The legitimacy of police in a democratic society relies on the source of police 
authority, the expression of that authority, as well as the effectiveness and perceived 
legitimacy of safeguards against the misuse of such authority. Accordingly, a review of police 
authority, the legal status of police, as well as the challenge of balancing police independence 
and accountability is required to better understand the issues.  
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Police Authority 
 
 Social scientists define authority as legitimate power at the base of social control in 
society (Carter and Radelet, 1999). Michael Banton, a noted social anthropologist, argued that 
“public resentment against police is usually directed against their exercise of power, under 
circumstances in which the community support is questionable, ambiguous, or clearly 
divided” (as cited in Carter and Radelet, 1999: 10). In other words, public dissent arises and 
the legitimacy of police is questioned when the police are, or are perceived to be, arbitrarily 
imposing authority or abusing it. Banton added that authority comes “from the free agreement 
of individuals to observe certain mutually convenient rules” (as cited in Carter and Radelet, 
1999: 11). This social contract between the state and its’ citizens is central to law and social 
order.  
The preamble to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) asserts that 
“Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law.” 
The supremacy of the rule of law was recognized as a principle of the English Constitution 
and, accordingly, adopted in Canada. In short, the rule of law is the principle that 
“governments must exercise their powers according to law and citizens must not be exposed 
to arbitrary acts” (Oppal, 1994: B-2). The police, as agents of government, “represent the 
legitimate use of force governments have to control citizens and so they exist, in concept and 
in practice, at odds with many of the most important characteristics of a democratic society” 
(Seagrave, 1997: 3). While the legitimacy of this claim is generally accepted in Canadian 
society, it is theoretically compromised because the legal status of police and governance in 
Canada remains unclear.   
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Legal Status of Police and Governance in Canada 
 
Policing in Canada is governed in varying forms and degrees by all orders of 
government (Police Sector Council, 2001). Under British North America Act (1867), 
responsibility for criminal justice rests with the federal parliament and provincial legislatures. 
Their role in relation to policing and respective to one another, however, is ambiguous 
(Stenning, 1982). Section 91 of the Act authorizes Parliament to legislate criminal law and 
procedure, while also according it responsibility for “peace, order, and good government.” 
While the federal government appears to have drawn its constitutional authority to form the 
now Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) under this latter responsibility, the majority of 
Canadian police are not federal and fall within the scope of provincial responsibility.     
Although section 92(14) of the Act requires provinces to affect the “administration of 
justice”, the courts did not, until recently, seriously question the presumption that policing 
falls within the constitutional sphere of provincial “administration of justice” (Grant, 1981). 
Notwithstanding the recent Supreme Court affirmation, provincial governments have 
historically assumed this authority. This occurred through the formation of provincial police 
forces in some instances, and through the widespread enactment of provincial legislation that 
delegated the duties of policing and the local maintenance of law and order to municipalities 
(Grant, 1981). Municipalities, in turn, have typically sub-delegated the responsibility for 
police governance to a local police board (Police Sector Council, 2001). The cumulative 
effect of these varying arrangements is:   
…most police services have parallel responsibilities to multiple governing 
bodies, usually including some form of local oversight, a provincial authority, 
and in the case of the RCMP, the federal Solicitor General. There are also 
provincial and federal civilian oversight bodies which have some influence 
(Police Sector Council, 2001: 23). 
 
 20
Just as “parallel responsibilities” may be complicated for police executives to function 
within, so too can it be a source of confusion and consternation for those charged with police 
governance. While the constitutional authority of all orders of government respective to 
policing is evident, the scope and form of their responsibilities are not mutually exclusive or 
coherent. As an example, a provincial government’s authority may be diminished by federal 
authority in matters involving provincially contracted RCMP, as these officers remain subject 
to the federal RCMP Act and not the provincial police act (Grant, 1981).   
Given the ambiguous and often overlapping framework of governmental authority and 
responsibilities respective to policing in Canada, the literature on the subject often turns to the 
legal status of police to define the police/government relationship. To do so, however, 
generates little resolution. Insofar as the authority of governments over police is unclear, as is 
the constitutional position of police (Grant, 1981). In the Ipperwash Inquiry, the Policy 
Director stated:  
It appears that neither the statutory, constitutional, common law, nor policy 
rules in Ontario today clearly or adequately define the roles and responsibilities 
of the police and government respecting government intervention in, or 
influence over, certain kinds of police decision-making (Thomas, 2006: 4). 
 In 1981, the Law Reform Commission of Canada completed two studies to 
comprehensively examine the history of policing legislation and the legal status of police in 
Canada. The result was one of uncertainty and led one author to conclude:  
…he who ventures to generalize about the legal status of the police in Canada, 
and about its implications, does so at his peril. The police operate under a 
variety of statutes, which contain significantly different provisions respecting 
the status and accountability of the police. These statutory provisions, by 
themselves, leave many important questions unanswered (Stenning, 1982: 
130). 
 
Given the uncertain legal status of police in Canada, the scope and form of government-
delegated authority to police boards is equally uncertain. Absent a legal orientation, police 
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governance is oriented to the ideals of protecting police independence from state intrusion 
while ensuring police accountability. To understand these competing but compatible doctrines 
is to understand the crux of police governance.      
Police Independence and Accountability 
 
Fundamental to the legitimacy of police and state control in a democracy, principles of 
police independence and police accountability serve as a compass to the ever evolving 
relationship between both institutions. While “concerns about potential police abuses of 
authority reinforce democratic notions of state accountability”, “abuses of this power by the 
state reinforce the need for police to be independent and regulated more by the abstract rule of 
law” (Herbert, 2006: 482). In his oft-cited report on policing in British Columbia, then Justice 
Oppal stated “[t]he police cannot be a law unto themselves. Any system of governance that 
grants independence to police in the exercise of their special powers must also ensure that the 
police are accountable for their conduct” (1994: B-6). Critical to this discussion, it is 
important to first define and disentangle the notions of “independence” and “accountability”.   
Police Independence Defined 
 
 Margaret Beare, in the most recent and comprehensive review of police and 
government relations in Canada to date, articulated the apparent disconnect between 
current practice and rhetoric in police independence:  
Because the police…are created to carry out government intentions regarding 
law enforcement and security, and are dependent on government for their 
existence, authority, and resources, they are said to be part of the executive 
arm of government. Yet, traditionally, we maintain a belief in, repeat the 
rhetoric of, and, in some cases, protect the practice of, the independence of 
policing. We may be making false assumptions about the ‘naturalness’ of this 
independence (2007: 317).   
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Academic commentary on the subject of police independence in Canada is extensive because 
of the number of commissions of inquiry tasked with uncovering political interference. 
Through this literature, there is general consensus on the doctrine that police are answerable 
to the law itself, and not their civic masters (Grant, 1992; Sossin, 2004; Stenning, 1992). In 
Stenning’s submission to the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Inquiry of 1998, he 
concluded that there was “very little clarity or consensus among politicians, senior RCMP 
officers, jurists… commissions of inquiry, academics, or other commentators either about 
exactly what ‘police independence’ comprises or about its practical implications” (Roach, 
2004: 1).  
 Independence is defined in a variety of ways throughout the literature. “Independence 
refers to a freedom from direction, control, or undue influence by others” (Stenning, 2000: 
156). Barber similarly defined independence as “not depending on authority or control” and 
“self-governing” (1998: 717). Elsewhere, Stenning defined it as “autonomy in decision-
making” (2004: 1). In contrast, Goldsmith defined it as “accountable to an autonomous 
official or body” (1991: 6). In the Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian 
Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, police independence was defined in simple, but general 
terms as “a common law and constitutional principle that governs the relationship between the 
police and the government” (O'Conner, 2004: 1). Most recently, the Law Commission of 
Canada defined police independence as “freedom from partisan political influence” (2006:  
85). This definition was adopted for this study.   
Police Accountability Defined 
 
 Central to notions of democratic policing and police legitimacy are the concepts of 
police control and accountability. These concepts are considered important elements to 
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promote the view of the police as both a necessary body and a body deserving of support. 
“Accountability is at the root of good policing, especially in a democracy (where) it is 
expected that those who wield public power must be fully accountable for this” (Reiner and 
Spencer, 1993: 3). Lewis expanded on this assessment:  
As our democratic institutions have matured, it has become increasingly 
apparent that no individual or organization performing important public 
services can maintain widespread respect and support without public 
accountability. The more significant and public the function, the more insistent 
is community need and demand for accountability to balance the responsibility 
and trust granted to the individual or organization (1991: 153). 
  
  Chan (1999) categorized the definition of police accountability in the literature as 
falling into two competing meanings. On the one hand, accountability was seen as ultimately 
concerned with control over the police, while, on the other hand, it was seen as fundamentally 
about requirements to give accounts or explanations of conduct. Chan noted that both models 
have been subject to criticism. 
  In earlier literature on police accountability, Goldstein stated that, in its broadest 
sense, accountability “includes much more than responsibility for determining policies in 
discretionary areas. It covers every aspect of administration of an agency, including, for 
example, its operating efficiency, its hiring and promotion practices, and its financial 
management” (1977: 131). Bayley took a narrow approach and defined police accountability 
as “processes whereby the behaviour of police is brought into conformity with the 
requirements of the encapsulating society” (1985: 160).  
 According to Brodeur, there are two core elements in the meaning of accountability: 
“rendering an objective account, which is an information process, and facing up to the 
consequences of not having met the required standards of behaviour and performance” (1999: 
158). He added that, as a consequence, there were two main failures with regard to 
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accountability. The first was the provision of inadequate information which Brodeur 
characterized as a failure of openness. The second was the apparent impunity that was granted 
to office holders who had violated their standards of conduct and performance, which Brodeur 
characterized as a failure of fairness. He noted that only the failure of fairness aroused any 
public debate because the failure of openness, by definition, escapes public notice.    
 Den Boer (2002) offered a complementary view by distinguishing between internal 
and external accountability, and advancing notions of political, legal, and citizen 
accountability. Applying this approach, police accountability does not exclusively reside with 
police boards, but occurs through a nexus of informal and formal structures. In its report on 
policing, the Law Commission of Canada noted that “like other government organizations, 
police are accountable to different organizations for different aspects of their work” (2006: 
89). Broadly, these fall into five categories: 
(1) political accountability to governing authorities and beyond, through 
normal political processes; (2) legal accountability or accountability to the law 
through the courts and judiciary; (3) accountability to administrative agencies 
such as complaints commissions, human rights commissions and tribunals, 
government departments, provincial police commissions, treasury boards, 
auditors general or ombudsmen; (4) direct public accountability through such 
mechanisms as freedom of information legislation; and (5) special ad hoc 
accountability mechanisms such as royal commissions and other public 
inquiries (Law Commission of Canada, 2006: 89).  
 
Normandeau and Leighton (1990) posited a similar model of police being accountable in at 
least four different ways:  
Administratively, defined as fiscal accountability; Politically by virtue of 
adherence to a police act and to guidelines stated by local police boards and 
elected officials; Legally in respect to upholding and enforcing the law while 
recognizing civil rights, especially the Charter of Rights and Freedoms; and to 
the community (as cited in Seagrave, 1997: 193-194).  
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The authors’ characterization of “political” accountability to elected officials demonstrated 
the indifference sometimes applied in conceptualizing police governance and, particularly, 
how readily police independence may be lost under the cloak of accountability. While it is 
clear that police are accountable to constitutionally empowered governments, to label such 
accountability “political” as opposed to legal, and to suggest that this extends to “elected 
officials” inappropriately frames the relationship between elected officials and police and may 
perpetuate politics in policing. Seagrave attempted to reconcile the matter by explicitly adding 
that, “although the police are accountable to various levels of government, they must be 
politically neutral” (1997: 5-6).  
 Brodeur suggested that for accountability, three basic questions must be answered, 
namely, “who should be responsible, what for, and to whom?” (1999: 125). Reiner and 
Spencer (1993) took an expanded approach to these questions adding that in designing an 
adequate structure for police accountability, one must also determine what type of 
accountability police should have to relevant bodies and what mechanisms should be 
established to deliver effectively the appropriate type of accountability to such bodies.  
 Over the past 40 years, numerous Canadian court cases and commissions of inquiry 
have tried to address these questions. In particular, courts and commissions have attempted to 
resolve who the police are accountable to and whether the police are “employees in a ‘master 
and servant’ relationship with their ‘employer’ or an ‘office holder’ with direct obligations to 
discharge irrespective of the direction which might be received from the supervising 
authority” (Sossin, 2004: 18). The most oft-cited response is found in the British common law 
1968 case of R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex parte Blackburn in which Lord 
Denning stated:  
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…like every constable in the land, [the Commissioner of the London Police] 
should be, and is, independent of the executive. He is not subject to the orders 
of the Secretary of State, save that under the Police Act…The responsibility for 
law enforcement lies on him. He is answerable to the law and to the law alone 
(O'Conner, 2004: 1).     
 
 Although Lord Denning’s articulation was the subject of considerable debate in the 
years that followed, it has since been upheld by many courts, including the Supreme Court of 
Canada in R. v. Campbell and Shirose (1999). In this case, the court declared that the 
principle of police independence from the state in the exercise of its law enforcement 
functions “underpins the rule of law” which is “one of the fundamental and organizing 
principles of the Constitution” (R. v. Campbell and Shirose, 1999). Stated simply, once the 
police take political direction, the rule of law is subverted (Cooper, 2006). The Campbell case 
constituted this court’s most comprehensive review of the doctrine of police independence 
(Roach, 2004). Although common law offers some clarity to the doctrines of police 
independence and accountability, a review of five major Canadian public inquiries into 
apparent political interference and abuses of police independence demonstrates the intractable 
nature of this issue.      
Royal Commissions of Inquiry 
 
 Over the last 30 years, the McDonald Commission, Donald Marshal Commission, 
APEC Inquiry, Ipperwash Inquiry, and the Mahar Arar Inquiry have each grappled to further 
define and articulate the principles of police independence and accountability. While having 
some success in this regard, the commissions of inquiry have been most effective in 
corroborating the ongoing deficiencies of police/government relations and fueling the 
foundational assumptions of the policy of police governance; namely, that police require 
governance and that the state is not a legitimate agent for ensuring adequate and appropriate 
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governance of police. Given the longevity of these problems, commissions of inquiry also 
disprove the third assumption inherent in the policy of police governance; that the structure 
and processes of modern police boards in Canada adequately serve the intended purpose of 
ensuring that police are both accountable and independent. 
 McDonald Commission 
 
The McDonald Commission (1977) arose from a number of illegal activities by the 
RCMP Security Service, as well as the allegedly willful disregard of the Minister responsible 
for RCMP operations. Contrary to the narrow interpretation of independence as articulated in 
Ex parte Blackburn (1968), Justice McDonald concluded that the responsible Ministers 
should have extensive authority to direct, comment upon, or be advised of a wide range of 
police activities, including areas traditionally considered police “operations” (Roach, 2004). 
McDonald clarified, however, that:  
The Minister should have no right of direction with respect to the exercise by 
the R.C.M.P. of the powers of investigation, arrest, and prosecution. To that 
extent, and to that extent only, should the English doctrine expounded in Ex 
parte Blackburn be made applicable to the R.C.M.P. (O'Conner, 2004: 8).  
 
In summary, the McDonald Commission expanded the discourse on the legal notion of police 
independence, notwithstanding the legal affirmation of Lord Denning’s narrow articulation in 
R. v. Campbell and Shirose (1999), by clarifying that Ministers cannot be responsible for 
police operations and, equally, that police investigations and powers of arrest and prosecution 
must be above political reproach.  
 Marshal Commission 
 
Although the Donald Marshal Commission (1989) is best known for its focus on his 
wrongful murder conviction, it also examined the conduct of two Nova Scotia cabinet 
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members, each under investigation by the RCMP for criminal wrongdoing. In this case, the 
pair was not charged despite sufficient grounds to do so (O'Conner, 2004). Through the 
Commission of Inquiry, it was determined that the Attorney General interfered with the 
investigation by personally intervening in the decision-making processes. In this high-profile 
Commission, Hickman, Poitras, and Evans condemned political influence in the Nova Scotia 
justice system concluding:  
…the RCMP failed in its obligation to be independent and impartial. It was 
improperly influenced by factors unrelated to the investigation itself, but it 
attempted to explain the decision not to proceed in evidentiary and 
discretionary terms. The RCMP put its working relationship with the 
Department of Attorney General ahead of its duty to uphold the law 
(O'Conner, 2004: 11). 
 
 APEC Inquiry 
 
In the APEC Inquiry (2000) into police and government actions surrounding the 
protests at the 1997 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, Justice Hughes 
confirmed a number of allegations that police actions were “inconsistent with the Charter and 
inappropriate to the circumstances” (1999: para 29). In particular, ‘the strip-searches of all 
female prisoners were not justified, were far too intrusive in the circumstances, and were 
neither reasonable nor necessary” (Hughes, 1999: para 29). On the matter of political 
interference, Justice Hughes surmised that the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) may have 
given orders to senior RCMP personnel and that there was clear evidence that the PMO 
became very involved in a matter that ought to have been the exclusive reserve of the RCMP 
(Hughes, 1999). 
 Ipperwash Inquiry 
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The Ipperwash Inquiry (2004) examined the events surrounding the death of Dudley 
George who was shot during a protest by Aboriginal people at Ipperwash Provincial Park in 
September 1995. As a complement to the Inquiry, an academic conference was hosted and 
five papers were authored on different elements of the issue. In a memorandum to the 
academics, the Inquiry’s Director of Policy and Research provided the following insight:    
We are obviously concerned with ensuring the professionalism of policing and 
preventing partisan policing or inappropriate government influence. We are also 
obviously concerned about police becoming “a law unto themselves,” free from 
democratic input or control on appropriate issues. We are further concerned about the 
accountability of both police and government decision-making (Thomas, 2006: 4). 
 
 Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar 
 
The high-profile Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in 
Relation to Maher Arar (2006) examined Arar’s erroneous detention in the United States and 
subsequent deportation to Syria. The final report was not an indictment of police 
independence or political interference in Canada, per se. Instead, it may be better 
characterized as an indictment of the political nature of policing between countries, and, in 
particular, the United States. Noteworthy was the finding that the Canadian government 
manipulated the media “for the purpose of…protecting their self-interest or government 
interest” (O'Conner, 2006a: 3).      
 These inquiries, as part of the history of policing in Canada, have shown, repeatedly, 
the inadequacies of an exclusive reliance upon police self-regulation (Bayley, 1991; 
Goldsmith, 1999; Goldsmith, 2005). Equally apparent in these inquiries is that political 
interference in policing has a longstanding history in Canada. In Sossin’s presentation to the 
Ipperwash Commission, he adeptly summarized the findings of previous inquiries and their 
relevance to police governance as follows:  
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We should not lose sight of the fact that attempts to use police forces as an arm 
of “political administration” of the government of the day has a long and 
unsettling history in Canada, nor should we gloss over the equally long and 
equally unsettling history of the police acting as a law unto themselves…This 
is the classic double-bind of executive-police relationships – how to guard 
against one extreme without inviting the other (2004: 4). 
 
Cyclically, the competition between “independence” and “accountability” is central to an 
inherently tenuous relationship between police and police governance. Sossin’s “classic 
double-bind” may be resolved, however, by perceptually shifting from the notion that police 
independence and accountability are diametrically opposed toward an ideal wherein the two 
are competing, but compatible. 
Competing but Compatible Ideals 
 
 In the literature, the notions of “independence” and “accountability” are consistently 
framed as competing, intractable, and problematic. By all accounts, attempts to define police 
independence seem reliant on the degree that police are free from accountability (Stenning, 
2004). Combating any idea that independence is the antithesis of accountability, the most 
recent literature offers new ways of thinking about these notions as competitively 
interdependent and compatible. While governors must ensure accountability to the rule of 
law, Justice Oppal’s summation of several royal commissions asserted that “the police should 
have a degree of independence” (1994: B-5). Defining this “degree” may provide the key to 
reconciling these competitively compatible principles.  
In Stenning’s submission to the Ipperwash Commission, he articulated a graphic 
illustration between degrees of “control” and degrees of “accountability” to demonstrate the 
two “parallel and interlocking mechanisms” (2004: 2): 
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In this illustration, quadrant three represents the more common definition of police 
independence as freedom from control and accountability. Quadrant four, in contrast, 
represents independence as a compatible notion of freedom from control, but not 
accountability.  
 In contrast, Roach constructed four ideal models of police-government relations 
reflecting a continuum of police independence: 
Full police independence: police are immune from governmental intervention 
on a wide variety of matters.   
Quasi-judicial police independence: police independence is restricted to the 
process of criminal investigation.  
Democratic policing: similarly restricts police independence, but places 
greater emphasis on the appropriate Minister’s responsibility and control over 
policy matters in policing.  
Governmental policing: both minimizes the ambit of police independence and 
accepts the greater role of central agencies in coordinating governmental 
services, including policing (2004: 39-48). 
Although it may be inferred from Roach’s typology that a direct, inverse relationship exists 
between independence and accountability, the functional scope and form of such 
accountability remains unanswered here and elsewhere in the literature; a problem which 
police boards are charged to mediate.   
Police Governance in Canada 
 
The idea of a “board of police” as an institution of police governance first emerged in 
New York City (Fosdick, 1969; as cited in Stenning, 1992). In Canada, in 1858, the 
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Municipal Institutions of Upper Canada Act required that each of the five cities in the colony 
establish a Board of Commissioners of Police. The Act, which represented the first 
documented policy relating to police governance in Canada, directed that "the Constables 
shall obey all the lawful directions, and be subject to the government of the Board…" (Biro, 
2006). Despite the evidently political composition of early boards, and some today, Fosdick 
noted that the hope of the legislature was to “eliminate the political favortism and ward 
control which prior to that time had dominated the [police] department” (1969; as cited in 
Stenning, 1992: 444). Fosdick’s account of history was affirmed by the Law Commission of 
Canada:    
Police boards…were established with the specific intention of insulating the 
police from direct governance by elected municipal politicians, and 
guaranteeing a measure of political independence for police services in the 
performance of their duties. The idea has been to further remove the police 
from direct political control by ensuring that these independent bodies, rather 
than elected politicians, provide policy direction and approve police budgets  
(2006: 85). 
 
 During this 150 year history, police boards in Canada have experienced substantial 
change to their membership and authority (Biro, 2006) and nowhere is this more evident than 
in the varied composition, structure, and mandate of police boards today (Griffin, 2006; 
Stenning, 1992). Despite this history and modification to police boards, a recent report on 
police governance in Canada concluded:    
It is ironic that after 150 years of the creation of police boards to separate 
policing from political partisanship, interference, and control, and all the 
tinkering that has occurred since that time, today’s police service boards are 
still very much perceived as political organs controlled by municipal councils 
(Griffin, 2006: 17).  
 
This conclusion was supported by a 2001 government study of policing wherein “the issue of 
politicization was one of the most consistent issues raised by nearly all interviewees” (Public 
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Sector Council, 2001: 25). Many respondents perceived increased scrutiny of policing 
operations by municipal councils and boards as political interference. In this case, “political 
interference” was generally defined as the “direct involvement of political authorities 
(primarily, although not exclusively, at the municipal level) in policing operations, as opposed 
to policy and funding” (Public Sector Council, 2001: 25).  
Police Board Structure 
  
 In his review of police boards, Stenning (1992) noted that, while there was no 
dominant model present in Canada, every model presented strengths and weaknesses, 
particularly when evaluated against the ideal of political independence. In its review of police 
governance, the Law Commission of Canada recently affirmed this finding by concluding that  
“[o]ver the years, the precise role and influence of police boards, and indeed their very 
existence, have been the subject of debate” and that “structurally, there are limitations to their 
effectiveness” (2006: 87).  
Lewis identified three methods by which governments can undermine an oversight 
body’s ability to deliver effective police accountability: (1) they can deny the accountability 
institutions the powers needed to fulfill their role; (2) they can undermine an oversight body’s 
credibility in the eyes of the honest police and community by making inappropriate 
appointments to the civilian body; and (3) government can undermine an oversight body’s 
effectiveness by ignoring it (2000: 30-31). The ideal of police governance applied in this 
major paper is based on a notion that how and how well a police board fulfills its 
responsibilities determines the extent to which the police are appropriately independent of 
political interference and accountable to the rule of law. However, the effect of police board 
structure on a board’s ability to realize this ideal remains empirically untested.  
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Board Size and Ratio of Elected Officials 
 
It has been argued that board size has an inverse relationship to the degree of effective 
monitoring provided by a board (Chin, Vos, & Casey, 2004). Known as ‘board size effect’ 
and drawn from organizational behaviour research, this argument suggests that “as work 
groups grow larger, total productivity exhibits diminishing returns” (Chin et al., 2004: 121). 
As Canadian police boards typically range in size from three to nine members, compared to 
boards of 15 or more in the private sector, the relative significance of board size is diminished 
in this context. Of greater significance is the ratio of elected officials on the board as this 
determines their collective voting power. An informal review of police board structures in 
Canada revealed that the ratio of elected officials to appointed citizens range from a minority 
of 1:6 in British Columbia to a majority of 3:2 in Saskatchewan. While each model is quite 
different, the effect of each on police independence is unknown. Specifically, it is unknown 
what, if any, effect arises from an elected official being on the board, being the chair or vice-
chair of the board, and/or being independently empowered to inform the appointment process 
of all other board members. Likewise, it is unknown what effect, if any, results from a police 
board comprised mostly of elected officials or that which appears to be a “committee of 
council”. What is clear, however, is that such analysis cannot occur without also considering 
the role of an elected official on the board (i.e.: chair or vice-chair), any limits imposed on 
their voting rights as a council member on the police board, as well as the role of the elected 
official in the appointment process.   
Roles and Rights of Elected Officials on Police Boards 
 
Whereas elected officials on Alberta police boards do not occupy executive roles 
(chair or vice-chair), mayors in British Columbia are, by law, the chair of the police board. In 
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a comprehensive review of police governance in British Columbia, Lalonde and Kean 
identified this issue as “perhaps the most hotly debated” in their research (2003: 94). 
Intuitively, for many, it is a conflict of interest at odds with the fundamental purpose of a 
police board to “insulate the police from direct governance by elected municipal politicians, 
and guarantee a measure of political independence for police services” (Public Sector 
Council, 2001: 25). Griffin affirmed this concern by stating that “having the senior elected 
official serve as chair of the board only serves to erode any remaining semblance of perceived 
independence between the police and political officials” (2006: 23). 
In Oppal’s 1994 review of police governance in British Columbia and Lalonde’s 
subsequent review in 2003, both advocated that the Mayor be an ex officio, non-voting 
member of the police board. Oppal stated that “board members should be as apolitical as 
possible, and as a political representative, a mayor would be an inappropriate chair” (1994: B-
66). Oppal extended this assertion by also recommending that “municipal councillors may not 
serve as members of police boards” (1994: B-65). Neither recommendation has been enacted 
in British Columbia.  
Appointment Processes 
 
In order for police boards to undertake their regulatory responsibilities effectively, the 
Law Commission of Canada contended that they must include two key elements. “First, they 
must be inclusive of the communities that they serve and, second, be selected through an open 
and transparent process” (2006: 133). While there is no recent empirical evidence to assess 
current practices against this ideal, there is considerable historical evidence to suggest that the 
appointment process has been perceived to be politically-driven more than merit-driven. 
Stenning has noted that, “most of those persons interviewed… seemed to agree that 
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appointments to police boards tend to be “political” in the sense that those who exercise the 
power of appointment are free to exercise their political judgement in the choice of 
appointees” (1992: 453). Oppal (1994) echoed this concern and affirmed that there was a 
perception that appointments were made on a political basis.  
Although differences exist between provinces, municipally elected officials and, in 
some cases, provincial politicians are responsible for appointing citizens to police boards. 
Where municipal officials are solely responsible for appointments, they have unfettered 
control in determining the composition of the board; a situation recognized more than 50 
years ago as effectively enabling council to control the board. In his 1954 book titled 
Canadian Municipal Government, Crawford offered insight to the realities of council-
appointed boards:    
Where a council appoints all or a majority of the personnel of a board, it can 
control the policy in a general way by its selection of appointees or by asking 
for resignations of appointees if policies are adopted which council does not 
approve. If, however, council appointees are in the minority the effectiveness 
of this control is restricted (1954: 129).  
 
Crawford’s historical observation, supported by more recent evidence and commentary by 
others (LaLonde and Kean, 2003; Oppal, 1994; Stenning, 1992), spoke to the importance of 
this issue in police governance.     
The Government of British Columbia examined its board appointment processes in 
recognition that improving corporate governance required selecting the right people to serve 
on the board (Watson, 2004). By “right people”, Watson referred to “directors who have the 
competencies and personal attributes to effectively drive corporate performance and ensure 
integrity and accountability” (2004: 1). She added that “by definition, boards lacking the 
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requisite mix of competencies and behaviours will be less effective, to the detriment of the 
corporation and, in the case of public-sector corporations, to the public at large” (2004: 3). 
Throughout the public administration literature, the rationale for appointing the “right 
people” to boards is well-evidenced. Vafeas asserted that “the quality of director 
appointments is ultimately what determines a board's monitoring effectiveness” (1999: 199). 
In effect, ineffective boards acquiesce to management and the board adds little or no value to 
the process. “Boards with a majority of trustworthy but uninformed ‘watchdogs’ can 
implement institutionally preferred policies” (Gillette, Noe, & Rebello, 2003: 1997). 
Conversely, ineffective boards may actively work against the organization’s best interests 
through its collective ignorance or vis-à-vis personal and/or political agendas (Vafeas, 1999). 
This outcome, according to Watson (2004), can have devastating consequences to a public 
board.  
The inference is that the “right people” are those appointed based on merit and not 
political patronage. A patronage appointment is defined as “one that applies to an individual 
who is not qualified for the job, but who is nevertheless appointed based on political 
considerations rather than the knowledge, skills, and experience required” (Watson, 2004: 2). 
Watson’s position that the most effective boards enjoy a merit-based appointment process, 
rather than political patronage, is widely shared (LaLonde and Kean, 2003; Oppal, 1994; 
Sossin, 2004). As it is sometimes the case that an individual is both meritorious and 
politically supported, these concepts are not mutually exclusive.  
To mitigate the inherent challenges discussed, police board appointments are done by 
both the municipal and provincial governments in British Columbia and Ontario. Although 
this diffused approach may insulate boards from the control that accompanies a municipal 
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monopoly on appointment, anecdotal evidence suggests that the model presents a new set of 
politically-charged issues. The key, according to Vafeas, is to utilize an independent 
nominating committee. This approach, he advocated, involved “abstracting from the board 
environment which may be dominated by the CEO and other insiders, into an environment 
with limited or no insider participation, where nominations are more likely to be consistent 
with shareholder interests” (1999: 200).  
The literature on board appointment and composition, much of which is found within 
the field of business management, is focussed on the different effects of “outsiders” and 
“insiders” on everything from firm performance to the tenure of the CEO (Davidson, Pilger, 
& Szakmary, 2004). Vafeas’s rationale for a nominating committee comprised of outsiders 
was that “insiders generally have a high equity investment in the firm and may therefore seek 
committee membership for reasons of power” (1999: 220). In a complementary study based 
on 426 annual observations of New Zealand firms across a five-year period, Chin, Vos, and 
Casey (2004) concluded that board composition had no effect on firm performance. Similarly, 
Daily, Dalton, and Cannella Jr. noted that “extant studies have failed to reveal a systematic 
significant relationship between board independence and firm financial performance” (2003: 
375). Despite these select findings, Lynall, Golden, and Hillman surmised that the “empirical 
findings of a board's impact on firm performance have been inconclusive” (2003: 416). 
While these results may be inconclusive, stronger evidence supported a relationship 
between the ability of a board to effectively monitor management and board independence, 
where the degree of independence was related to its composition (John and Senbet, 1988; 
cited in Prevost et al., 2002). Based on a five-year study of New Zealand-based firms, 
researchers found that “board composition becomes significant as the primary responsibility 
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in keeping the board independent depends on outside disinterested members of the board that 
are not directly beholden to management” (Prevost et al., 2002: 732). On the relationship 
between board composition and CEO tenure, Mikkelson and Partch (1997) concluded that 
there was little evidence of a relationship. Notwithstanding these results, the absence of 
research specific to the public sector, particularly to the unique setting of police boards, 
makes the transferability and generalizability of these results difficult.   
Negating the role of outsiders and insiders is a model of police board appointment that 
is entirely open and transparent to the public, as suggested by Oppal (1994). Specifically, 
Oppal recommended that “all police board positions be advertised and applications solicited” 
and that “short-listed applicants be interviewed in public by council about their qualifications 
and their views about policing” (1994: B-61). Over the past 12 years, numerous similar policy 
recommendations have been made relating to police governance in Canada, generally, and to 
appointment processes specifically. Although Sossin (2004), Lalonde (2003), and Oppal 
(1994) have comprehensively, albeit not empirically, examined these issues and provided the 
most oft-cited recommendations, it is worth noting that none of these recommendations have 
been implemented.  
Legislated Mandate 
  
According to the Canadian Association of Police Boards (2006), although there are 
variances in the mandate of police boards in Canada, most are responsible for: (1) determining 
adequate personnel levels; (2) budgeting for needs of police service; (3) monitoring the 
budget; (4) reviewing the performance of the service; (5) hiring the chief of police; (6) labour 
relations; (7) discipline; and (8) policy development. Some boards are also responsible for 
negotiating collective agreements, setting police priorities, and overseeing the complaints 
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process. The first challenge imposed by this mandate is its broad and general nature. Second, 
the scope and form of the police board’s authority to affect the mandate is unclear.  
 This issue is aggravated by an historical reliance on a paradigm of “operations” and 
“policy” to guide the scope of board governance and authority. Police boards are “limited to 
planning, not operations” (LaLonde and Kean, 2003: 29). The ability of a board to realize its 
mandate is constrained by this paradigm and leaves police boards and chiefs in the constantly 
perilous position of negotiating competing interests. “The relationship between the chief and 
the police board is inextricably tied to what each believes or perceives to be their respective 
responsibilities and roles” (Hayes, 2001: 150). In Stenning’s (1981) early review of municipal 
police governance in Canada, he concluded that there was virtually no consensus among 
police chiefs or police board members as to either the appropriate roles and responsibilities of 
chiefs and police boards, or what general principles should govern their relationship.   
As an example, police boards are mandated and authorized to review the performance 
of the service. This is a very general statement, open to conflicting interpretation by the board 
and the chief. Buoyed by legislation and an over-riding obligation to ensure police 
accountability, boards may feel compelled and authorized to examine operations as part of 
this performance review. Under the current construct, however, the chief is well-positioned to 
resist such efforts citing the board’s responsibility to policy and planning, not operations. As 
well, the chief might reasonably assert the over-riding tenet of police independence.  
To address this problem, Shearing proposed the notion of “operational responsibility” 
to replace “operational independence” that has “for decades bedevilled attempts to hold the 
police democratically accountable in a variety of countries” (2000: 390). Shearing’s notion of 
operational responsibility challenged the idea that police oversight was not to extend to 
 41
operational matters insisting that “it is precisely this operational domain that requires scrutiny 
if policing, wherever it is located, is to be held democratically accountable” (2000: 390). 
Although Canadian police executives and boards recognize the problems inherent to the 
current “operations” and “policy” paradigm, there is no evidence to suggest that Shearing’s 
notion of operational responsibility is taking hold. Until this matter is clarified legislatively, 
boards and chiefs will continue to rely on, and risk, their relationship in the pursuit of 
resolution.  
Police Board/Chief Relationship 
 
In its most recent review of best practices in police board governance, the Canadian 
Association of Police Boards concluded that, “the most important principle of board 
governance is that the board has one ‘employee’….the Chief of Police. Establishing a mutual 
understanding of the division of authority between the board and the Chief of Police is 
crucial” (2005: 19). Although this view appears widely accepted in the literature (Graham, 
2005; Griffin, 2006; Hayes, 2001; Shen, 2003), the legislative frameworks governing the 
function and form of the relationship are conspicuously vague and inconsistent across Canada.  
As a consequence of such ambiguity in the board/chief relationship, anecdotal 
evidence and media accounts suggest that a spectrum of relationships, from functional to 
dysfunctional, exists. Hayes pointed out that “the relationship between boards and chiefs of 
police appear to be frequently poorly enunciated, full of uncertainty and the subject of 
considerable, and potentially important, disagreements” (2001: 154). Particularly as a 
consequence of the underdeveloped distinction between policy and operations, conflicts 
between police chiefs and their board inevitably arise (Martin, 2004).  
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Knoll, a former police board member and noted expert on police governance, 
described the police board member relationship with the chief as falling into one of two 
categories: “Cops are S.O.B.s” and “Cops are Tops” (2005: 3). In the first category, 
relationships dominated by conflict may perpetuate the often secretive “thin blue line” of 
police marked by isolation, solidarity, and suspicion (Reiner, 1992). Such contention also puts 
chiefs under added pressure resulting in increased stress (Crank, Regoli, Hewitt, & 
Culbertson, 1995), health issues, and/or chief turnover, as evidenced by studies in Canada 
(Biro, Campbell, McKenna, & Murray, 2000) and the United States (Rainguet and Dodge, 
2001). These outcomes hold significant implications for the recruitment of future police 
executives.  
Qualitative data from a recent survey of 719 Canadian non-executive police officers 
revealed a “widespread belief that executives are overworked, and bogged down in politics 
and bureaucracy” (Murphy, 2006: 241). Although the sample size was small and not 
representative, many respondents cited this issue as significant enough to dissuade them from 
applying for executive police positions.  
In a similar study of Canadian police executives in 1998, this perception was affirmed 
by the researchers’ summation that police executives undergo severe pressures, such as public 
criticism and/or a lack of confidence from their police board (Biro et al., 2000). Contradicting 
this conclusion, nearly all (92.0 per cent) of 162 Canadian police executives surveyed in a 
follow-up study stated that they found the board to be “supportive of the executive’s 
decisions” (Murray and Alvaro, 2001: 44). Likewise, most respondents found the governing 
authority to be effective and knowledgeable, although slightly less than one-third (30.0 per 
cent) of respondents reported referring major decisions to the board (Murray and Alvaro, 
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2001). By keeping the board “in the dark”, members are at a distinct disadvantage and this 
may give credence to Knoll’s “cops are SOBs” approach to board governance.     
In Knoll’s second category, wherein board members adopted a “cops are tops” 
relationship, there is an inherent risk of members abdicating their responsibilities to hold 
management accountable. After interviewing Canadian police association leaders, Griffin 
cited “consensus…that chiefs of police are generally leading their boards by their noses, and 
board members often appear reluctant to challenge the status quo” (2006: 21). In reality, there 
is a significant gap in expertise between the board and its chief and, as a consequence, boards 
are inherently reliant on the chief. This point was reflected in the Ontario Police Commission 
inquiry into the Waterloo Regional Police Service:  
Boards of Commissioners of Police, by the very nature of their composition, 
must rely heavily upon their Chief of Police for the expertise required to 
operate the police force. They must spell out general policy, through 
regulations and direction, but in the administration of the Force, they must rely 
on the Chief of Police, otherwise the board is assuming the prerogative of the 
Chief, and is, in effect, becoming the Office of the Chief, for which the board 
has neither the time nor the expertise (cited in Hayes, 2001: 154; LaLonde and 
Kean, 2003: 28). 
 
 This problem was also observed by Stenning (1981) who determined that the part-time 
and short-term tenure of police board members resulted in a practical dependence on the chief 
for the resources and expertise necessary for policy development and oversight. Similarly, 
Demb and Neubauer (as cited in LaLonde and Kean, 2003) suggested that a lack of requisite 
time and expertise, a structural problem found in most under-performing boards, may be to 
blame. Whereas the board may possess the legal responsibility for the performance of the 
organization, it is the organization’s management that possesses the infrastructure, 
knowledge, time, and the willingness to bear this responsibility. Noteworthy, Demb and 
Neubauer’s second structural problem related to the desire of board members to (over) 
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identify with the organization and what it stands for; a description befitting the “cops are 
tops” approach to police board governance. 
As a former police board member, this writer observed the effectiveness of a more 
balanced, almost paternalistic, approach to police board relations with the chief. Board 
members maintained objectivity, independence, and a vigilant will to authoritatively hold the 
chief accountable in some instances, yet appropriately shift to support the police service and 
its chief where the situation dictated. Shen asserted that such a shift needed to occur over the 
tenure of the CEO. He stated that “the relationship of the board with the CEO needs to shift 
away from CEO leadership development toward the control of managerial opportunism as the 
CEO's tenure increases” (2003: 467). Regardless of the approach one subscribes to, 
experience and observation suggest that the board and chief alike are better served by 
understanding the complex and often competing dynamics which govern the relationship.   
Summary 
 
Despite a scarcity of empirical research into police governance in Canada, the 
available literature provided considerable commentary and consensus on the subject, some of 
which is summarized here. Police are a fundamental feature of a democratic society 
(Goldstein, 1977; Lapkin, 1999; Loader, 2000; Marenin, 2000). An historical overview of 
policing revealed the nearly constant role of politics yielding general acceptance that police 
and crime were inherently political (Bayley, 1970; Estrada, 2004; Goldsmith, 1991; Haggerty, 
2004). The importance of police being both independent and accountable was a central theme 
throughout the literature, yet these ideals were often framed as competing, intractable, and 
problematic. As an ancillary outcome of several commissions of inquiry, these ideals have 
been comprehensively considered and, by most accounts, attempts to define police 
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independence seemed reliant on the degree to which police were free from accountability 
(Oppal, 1994; Stenning, 2004). Consequently, the quandary of police governance is to 
mediate the two principles through a constant balancing act (Brogden 1992; cited in Marenin, 
2000; Wood and MacAlister, 2005).  
Police boards were established to insulate the police from political interference 
(Griffin, 2006; Law Commission of Canada, 2006; Fosdick, 1969: as cited in Stenning, 1992). 
After 150 years and considerable modification to the composition, structure, and mandate of 
police boards (Biro, 2006; Griffin, 2006; Stenning, 1992), they are still “very much perceived 
as political organs controlled by municipal councils” (Griffin, 2006: 17). This perception is 
well documented in the literature and bolstered by the experience of this writer as a former 
police board member. A dearth of evidence and relevant empirical research, however, leaves 
open the question of the veracity of such claims.  
 To assess the accuracy of this perception, an evidence-based approach was taken. 
Integral to this process was an exploration of those factors which contribute to the perception 
that police boards are political. The appointment process to police boards, as an example, is 
widely regarded as politically-driven (Oppal, 1994; Stenning, 1992) and was, therefore, an 
important factor to consider. Likewise, board structure, size, and mandate as well as the ratio, 
rights, and role of elected officials vis-à-vis the board were considered in this research.  
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Chapter Two: Research Methodology 
Hypothesis 
 
The hypothesis of this study is that the more inherently political a police board 
structure, as defined by its size, composition, appointment processes, and particularly the 
ratio, role, and rights of elected officials on the board, the less independent the police service 
is as reported by the chief constable.  
Survey Instrument 
 
Because of the pan-Canadian scope of this research, as well as the resource limitations 
(human and financial) of this study, a written survey was selected for its cost effectiveness 
and its inherent strength to canvass a breadth of issues in relatively short order. Moreover, 
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chiefs are typically very busy and the flexibility of a written survey to be completed on their 
schedule was appealing. This study used a confidential survey (Appendix A) comprised of 51 
questions.   
The major disadvantage to this methodology, aggravated in this case by the length of 
the instrument, is a low return rate. To mitigate this challenge, the researcher spent several 
months securing support from the most relevant national organizations. To this end, the 
Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (CACP) and the Police Sector Council formally 
endorsed the research in-principle and each provided a supporting letter (Appendix B).4 
Formal endorsement and support from these organizations added credibility to the research 
which was seen as critical to encouraging the participation of chiefs.   
Administratively, the Centre for Criminal Justice Research at the University of the 
Fraser Valley provided in-kind support through the provision of coordination and printing 
services. Likewise, the RCMP provided in-kind support through the provision of translation 
services. This support enabled the researcher to shift from a relatively low-cost sampling 
approach focused on English only police services to the more robust, pan-Canadian survey of 
all municipal police chiefs reporting to a police board.    
Procedurally, a letter on University of the Fraser Valley (UFV) letterhead was sent to 
all chiefs one week prior to the survey to introduce the research and encourage completion 
(Appendix C). A paper copy of the survey, attached with a copy of the CACP and Police 
Sector Council letters of support, was mailed to all police chiefs along with a self-addressed, 
postage-paid envelope. A follow-up letter (Appendix C), also on UFV letterhead, was sent to 
participants one week after the survey to encourage completion, if not already done so. 
                                                 
4 The Canadian Association of Police Boards was formally invited to participate in this research but chose to 
decline. 
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Noteworthy, police chiefs in Québec and New Brunswick received all documentation in 
English and French. In a final effort to increase the return rate, an email was sent to 110 of the 
original 170 police chiefs three days before the deadline to thank those that had completed the 
survey and serve as a reminder of the impending deadline. The 110 were the result of an 
exhaustive on-line search for the direct email address of every chief in the population.  
During the three-week process of administering the survey, the researcher provided a 
weekly progress report to the CACP and the Police Sector Council. The intention was to 
generate a heightened awareness among these organizations that the data collection phase was 
underway with the expectation that this would generate informal encouragement from the 
organizations to the surveyed population.  
The decision to administer the process through a series of three formal letters to the 
chiefs, followed by an email to the majority, was seen as essential to ensure that the 
population of busy executives received due notice and reminders. Although the research 
yielded a higher than expected return rate, the effect of this strategy cannot be distinguished 
from any effect that, for example, the endorsement from the national organizations may have 
had. It is equally plausible that the subject matter was one that resonated for the population of 
chiefs and this was the source for the strong participation rate. Notwithstanding, it appears 
that the cumulative effect of these strategies was worthwhile and effective.   
Survey Population 
 
The research subjects were current chief constables from all Canadian municipal 
police services identified as reporting to a police board or commission. Chiefs were presumed 
for this purpose to be “experiential experts” as they are the only police officer in a police 
service subject to formal “orders” from a police board. The ensuing assumption was that 
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police chiefs would provide the best portal for testing the concept of police independence. 
Moreover, the characteristics of the sample group were known and the population has 
previously demonstrated itself as “remarkably homogenous” (Murray and Alvaro, 2001: 9).  
Administratively, identifying the population was complicated by the absence of any 
single list or database that captured all current municipal police chiefs. Accordingly, the 
population was extrapolated from a more comprehensive list of Canadian police executives by 
removing all those that could be readily identified as outside the population of interest. In 
many instances, on-line research was conducted to determine if a particular police service met 
the parameters set for the survey population. This process yielded an original sample of 170 
police chiefs.  
To determine if a statistically significant relationship existed between police board 
structure - defined as the size of the board, as well as the ratio, roles, and rights of elected 
officials on the board - and police independence, a survey of all Canadian municipal police 
chiefs provided a requisite range of the variables tested. Specifically, boards typically ranged 
in size from three to nine members. Some comprised a majority of elected officials, while 
others only had one elected official on a board of seven. In some cities, citizens were 
appointed by municipal councils alone, while the provincial government appointed some 
members to other boards. The provincially-legislated mandate of boards also differed and 
although this was not a key variable, it was considered.  
Conceptualizations 
 
Given the subjectivity of this research, particularly as it relates to police independence vis-
à-vis chiefs’ experience with politicians and police boards, a number of conceptualizations 
were essential. The following conceptualizations were explicitly highlighted in the survey 
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instrument to promote the overall validity and reliability of the data. While most were defined 
by the researcher, the operational definitions selected for the particularly subjective concepts 
of police independence, political interference, and patronage appointment were adopted from 
research already conducted in this area, as cited here: 
? Legislation refers to the provincial police act governing the service and police board. 
? Service refers to the police department of which you are the chief constable.  
? Police board refers exclusively to the police board/commission that you report to.  
? Board members refer to individuals, elected and appointed, on the board. 
? Council refers to the municipally elected body that the police board relates to. 
? Police independence refers to“freedom from partisan political influence” (Law 
Commission of Canada, 2006: 85). 
? Political interference refers to “direct involvement of political authorities (primarily, 
although not exclusively, at the municipal level) in policing operations, as opposed to 
policy and funding” (Police Sector Council, 2001: 25). 
? Patronage appointment is “one that applies to an individual who is not qualified for 
the job but who is nevertheless appointed based on political considerations rather than 
the knowledge, skills, and experience required” (Watson, 2004: 2). 
? Merit appointment is one that applies to an individual who is qualified for the job 
based on the knowledge, skills, and experience required.  
Dependent Variables and Operationalization 
 
The dependent variable in this research was police independence. Because of the 
subjective nature of the phenomena being tested, data on a range of measures were taken, 
including:  
? The degree to which the chief perceived the board appointment process as merit 
driven; 
? The degree to which the chief perceived the board appointment process to be 
political patronage;  
? The degree to which the chief perceived the board members as independent to vote 
without fear of political reprisal, including being dismissed without cause or not 
reappointed; 
? The degree to which the board viewed itself as mandated to “buffer” police from 
political interference; 
? The degree to which the chief assessed the board to be effective as a “buffer” from 
political interference;  
? The average tenure of chief over the last ten years and the reasons for departure of 
the last chief;  
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? The number of private contacts a chief received from individuals and the chief’s 
corresponding assessment of perceived independence in these contacts; and 
? The degree to which the chief experienced political interference in an 
investigation, an activity that is indisputably central to police independence. 
  
Independent Variables 
 
The independent variables in this research were comprised of the varying elements 
defining police board structures. The size of a board, length of board member terms, board 
mandate, the ratio, roles, and voting rights of elected officials on the board, as well as the ratio 
of municipally and/or provincially-appointed members, served as independent variables.  
Ethical Considerations 
 
Confidentiality was the most important consideration in this research, given the 
sensitivity inherent to questions of political interference, as well as the power imbalance 
between respondents (chiefs constables) and those that they were being surveyed about 
(police boards/council members). Confidentiality was assured by collecting information that 
could not personally identify any survey respondents. To minimize the risk of respondents 
accidentally disclosing identifying information, the preamble to the survey explicitly 
instructed respondents to refrain from placing any identifying information on the survey. 
Where a respondent included any identifier (i.e.: name of a person, place, or description of a 
narrow circumstance), the identifier was removed from the dataset. Likewise, no efforts were 
made to extrapolate from completed surveys the city, region, province, or police service of the 
respondent.  
To further facilitate confidentiality, the paper surveys were administered entirely 
through Canada Post, as opposed to a courier or electronic mail where one’s identity could 
have become known upon receipt of the reply. Every package mailed to a respondent included 
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a pre-paid, self-addressed return envelope to eliminate respondents’ use of an in-house 
postage meter which might have identified their particular police service. In the event that 
these measures failed and identifying information was accidentally disclosed by the 
respondent (i.e.: a business card was attached to the returned survey), such information was 
immediately removed and disregarded. All participants were over the age of 18 and knew that 
they were subjects in a research study on police independence. The researcher possessed no 
power over any of the participants and, likewise, had no real or perceived conflict of interest 
with the research or any of the participants. No coercion or deception was exerted to acquire 
informed consent from the participants.   
Limitations 
 
 There were two notable limitations to this research. Since the RCMP, Aboriginal 
police agencies, and provincial police agencies, including the Ontario Provincial Police, 
Sûreté du Québec, and the Royal Newfoundland Constabulary, have different governance 
structures, the survey was limited to chief constables from municipal police services with a 
police board alone. Second, completed surveys from municipal police chiefs reporting to a 
committee-of-council were excluded from the population as the survey instrument was not 
designed for this population. Notwithstanding the specificity of the results to the defined 
population surveyed, police independence and governance is relevant to all police agencies 
and chiefs. The findings of this study should, therefore, be of use and interest to all those 
involved in policing, police governance, and politics.    
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Chapter Three: Research Results and Discussion 
Overview of Population 
 
 An initial population of 170 Chief Constables received the survey. Because the RCMP 
and provincial police agencies are more prominent in some provinces, the geographical 
distribution of municipal police agencies varies. This was reflected in the surveyed population 
as follows: 11 from British Columbia; seven from Alberta; 12 from Saskatchewan; 12 from 
Manitoba; 60 from Ontario; 42 from Québec; nine from New Brunswick; 12 from Nova 
Scotia; four from Prince Edward Island; and one from Newfoundland.  
 Identifying municipal chief constables who reported to a police board was difficult 
given the accessible databases. Consequently, through the administration of the survey, it was 
determined that several of the 170 surveys mailed were to chiefs who did not meet the 
sampling frame. Specifically, four chiefs responded through email that they did not report to a 
police board and would not be participating. Because non-participation was confirmed, these 
were removed for purposes of determining the return rate. Six additional surveys were mailed 
to police services later identified as Aboriginal or parks police and, therefore, outside the 
sampling frame. Because non-participation by these six agencies could not be confirmed, each 
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remained within the sampled population yielding a net of 166 administered. With 94 surveys 
returned, a strong return rate of 56.6% was realized.   
 Among those returned, four agencies indicated that they do not meet the sampling 
frame. In an additional 15 cases, the returned survey presented information indicative of a 
‘committee of council’ and not a conventional police board. Specifically, these 15 surveys 
indicated that police governance was the sole responsibility of municipal employees or 
elected officials. The survey instrument was not designed with this model in mind and 
inclusion of the results, in some instances, would likely have affected the validity and 
reliability of the results. Consequently, these cases were removed from the analysis.   
 Of the 75 respondent police chiefs that reported to a police board, the mean tenure was 
70 months, or five years ten months (SD = 65.5) with a range of two to 288 months, or 26 
years. In a slight majority of cases (54.7 per cent), the respondent was the second chief 
constable in the last ten years, whereas 19 respondents (25.3 per cent) were the third, fourth, 
or fifth chief in last ten years.  
 A cursory look at the chiefs’ predecessors was conducted as part of the survey. To the 
extent that the respondent chief internalized the experience of their predecessor as contextual 
to the current operating environment, understanding the predecessor chief was important. A 
chief operating in an environment where the average tenure of the last three chiefs was two 
years, for example, was likely to have a different orientation than another respondent whose 
predecessor was chief for 20 years. In the surveyed population, the range of tenure held by the 
predecessor of respondent chiefs was between eight months and 24 years, with a mean tenure 
of 98 months, or eight years two months (SD = 62).  
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 Chiefs were asked to characterize the circumstance(s) of their predecessor’s departure. 
In the majority (52.0 per cent) of cases, the predecessor retired voluntarily or successfully 
completed the contract (28.0 per cent). The balance of cases yielded a range of circumstances 
including: predecessor chief was pressured to resign by council or the board (10.7 per cent); 
applied for contract renewal unsuccessfully (8.0 per cent); died (5.3 percent); resigned as a 
result of disciplinary issues or formal charges (5.3 per cent); resigned for health reasons (2.7 
per cent); and resigned due to conflict with membership or non-confidence vote (2.7 per cent). 
 To summarize the profile of respondent chiefs, their average tenure as chief was five 
years ten months and the majority were the second chief in ten years. The average tenure of 
the respondents’ predecessor was eight years two months and their predecessor was most 
likely to have retired voluntarily and/or successfully completed their contract. Analysis of 
these variables in conjunction with the variables associated with board structure and police 
independence revealed no statistically significant relationships. That is to say that there was 
no significant relationship between the number of chiefs in the last ten years, tenure of 
predecessors, or circumstance(s) of the predecessor’s departure and the size, composition, or 
mandate of the board. Likewise, no significant or important relationships were found between 
the number, tenure, and circumstances of predecessors and the variables associated with 
political interference and the chiefs’ perception of independence.          
Board Structure 
 
 Canadian police boards operate under a range of structures and this was reflected in 
the population surveyed. As demonstrated in Table 1, most respondents reported to a board 
with five people, comprised of one municipal appointee, two provincial appointees, and two 
council members, the latter of which often occupied the chair and/or vice-chair position. The 
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predominance of this structure was likely an artefact of the proportionately high number of 
Ontario chiefs in the sample (n = 60). In accordance with the Police Services Act of Ontario 
(1990), police boards in larger municipalities must consist of five members with the above-
described composition. It would, therefore, be a mistake to interpret this particular structure as 
typical.   
 
Table 1: Current police board structure of respondents 
 
# of  
Board 
Members 
(n = 75) 
# of 
Municipal 
Appointees 
(n = 75) 
# of 
Provincial 
Appointees 
(n = 73) 
# of 
Council 
Members 
(n = 75) 
 
Council Members  
Role 
(n = 75) 
 
Council 
Members Rights 
(n = 75) 
 
5 – 65.0% 
 
7 – 25.3% 
 
1 – 52.0%  
 
2 – 22.7%  
 
3 – 20.7% 
 
2 – 41.1% 
 
1 – 19.2% 
 
0 – 19.2% 
 
3 – 15.1% 
 
2 – 54.7% 
 
1 – 14.7% 
 
3 – 26.7% 
 
Chair                49.3%      
 
Vice-Chair       42.7% 
 
Reg. Member    1.3% 
 
Ex-officio          6.7% 
 
Voting        90.7%  
 
Non-voting   9.3% 
 Board Size 
 
 Among the population, the number of members on the board ranged from three to nine 
people, with the majority reporting to a board of either five people (64.0 per cent) or seven 
people (25.3 per cent). As discussed, the proportionately high number of five-member boards 
was likely a function of the concentration of municipal police chiefs in Ontario where police 
boards in larger municipalities, by law, consist of five members.5   
 A comparison of board sizes revealed no significant relationships when analyzed 
against the variables relating to chief perceptions of independence or reports of political 
pressure and interference. Likewise, an analysis of boards with five members (n = 48) and 
                                                 
5 S. 27(5) Police Services Act of Ontario (1990).  
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seven members (n = 19) did not yield any important or significant relationships in these areas. 
The responses of chiefs reporting to boards of five and seven members were consistent when 
asked about the extent to which the board understood its legislated mandate and operated 
within it. Responses were also consistent among the two groups when asked about the extent 
to which the board saw itself as a buffer between the police service and city council, and its 
effectiveness in doing so. There was similar consistency in responses surrounding the 
appointment processes where board size, as well as the number of provincial and municipal 
appointees, yielded no statistically significant relationship with the chiefs’ perceptions. 
Likewise, there was no significant relationship between board size and the extent to which 
chiefs felt independent when making operational and policy decisions. In summary, no 
significant differences resulting from board size were observed in the responses, and the 
notion of ‘board size effect’ (Chin et al., 2004) appeared to be irrelevant in this context.  
 Board Term 
 
 The length of a single term for municipally-appointed board members ranged from 
one to six years with four years being the most common (37.7 per cent), followed by three 
years (29.0 per cent). Likewise, the range of terms for provincial appointees was one to six 
years, although the most common was three years (54.4 per cent). While these variables did 
not significantly relate to any indicators of police independence analysed, a significant 
relationship emerged between the single term length of municipal appointees and the 
perception of these members as independent. In this context, the term ‘independent’ was 
defined for chiefs as, “free of political influence and fear of reprisal by council, including 
termination or not being reappointed.”  
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 The results revealed a significant relationship between the single term length of 
municipally appointed citizen board members and the chiefs’ perception of these board 
members as independent [x2 (4) =13.33, p=.01]. Analyses of responses (n = 68) revealed that 
while more than three-quarters (78.0 per cent) of chiefs agreed that board members with terms 
of three to six years (n = 50) were independent, only half (50.0 per cent) agreed that board 
members with terms of one or two years were independent. An anomaly was noted in the data 
in relation to those with a term of four years. Considerably lower agreement (61.5 per cent) 
was noted for those with four year terms than those with three (94.7 per cent) and six year 
terms (100%). This is likely the result of respondents mistakenly including council members 
with four-year terms in their calculation of citizen board member terms. Remarks found on at 
least two surveys were indicative of this error. Although the respondents’ error likely reduced 
the differences observed and produced lower significance, caution was exercised in the 
analysis of these findings.         
 A second significant relationship emerged between the length of a single term and the 
perception of the appointment process as ‘merit-driven’ [x2 (2) =5.95, p=.051]. A substantial 
majority (60.0 per cent) of respondents whose municipal board members single term length 
was three to six years perceived the appointment process as merit-driven (n = 50). In contrast, 
slightly more than one quarter (27.8 per cent) whose board members single term length was 
one or two years perceived the appointment process as merit driven (n = 18). Although short-
term appointees are typically eligible for reappointment to a maximum tenure of six years, 
short-term appointments are problematic and represent a structural limitation to board 
effectiveness (Law Commission of Canada, 2006).6  
                                                 
6 As a former police board member, this writer observed the difficulties inherent to one-year terms 
including an inability to provide requisite long-term leadership to complex issues, a weakened 
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  Board Mandate 
 
 There were minor variances in the legislative responsibilities of police boards. Most 
were responsible for: (1) reviewing the performance of chief (89.3 per cent); (2) policy setting 
for the service (88.0 per cent); (3) hiring the chief of police (88.0 per cent); (4) budgeting for 
needs of service (84.0 per cent); (5) monitoring the budget (84.0 per cent); (6) collective 
bargaining (75.7 per cent); (7) determining adequate personnel levels (74.3 per cent); and (8) 
priority setting for the service (68.0 per cent). In contrast, slightly less than half of police 
boards (47.3 per cent) were legislatively responsible for civilian complaint oversight. 
Additionally, some chiefs noted strategic/business planning as another responsibility of the 
board. These results were consistent with the varied board responsibilities identified by the 
Canadian Association of Police Boards (2006).    
 Given the substantive consensus among responses, very little was distilled about the 
relationship between specific responsibilities and the variables associated with police 
independence. The exception was a significant relationship between boards that were 
legislatively responsible for civilian complaint oversight (n = 35) and chiefs feeling 
independent when making policy decisions [x2 (1) = 5.553, p=.018]. Although the factors 
underlying this relationship could not be extracted from the results, it was likely a function of 
increased board involvement in policy development which arises naturally from its citizen 
complaint oversight role. Through the process of overseeing citizen complaints, the problems 
of a police service are more readily exposed to the board, and while most problems fall within 
                                                                                                                                                        
committee structure reliant on individuals whose tenure was tenuous, as well as the inability to 
affect succession management on the board. As a postscript, the local city council subsequently 
validated these observations by revising the term of board members to two years.   
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the domain of operations or personnel management, policy is the primary tool of redress for 
police boards.  
 The principle of operational independence relates directly to this discussion. Given the 
increased operational exposure to, and scrutiny by, a board mandated to provide citizen 
complaint oversight, one might expect a statistical relationship between the complaint 
oversight role and chiefs feeling operationally independent. The results, however, revealed no 
significant relationship between these two variables. This was likely a byproduct of the large 
number of chiefs that agreed elsewhere that the board understood its legislated mandate (84.0 
per cent) and operated within the purview of that mandate (88.0 per cent). These results 
reflected well for police governance in Canada and undoubtedly spoke to the calibre of 
professionals working on, and in support of, most police boards, as well as the calibre of 
training and education offered nationally and through provincial police governance bodies, 
where they exist.    
 In addition to those responsibilities which are legislatively articulated, police boards 
serve to “buffer” the police service from political interference. According to the Law 
Commission of Canada “police boards…were established with the specific intention of 
insulating the police from direct governance by elected municipal politicians, and 
guaranteeing a measure of political independence for police services” (2006: 85). From the 
perspective of chiefs, boards have indeed internalized this view as evidenced by the large 
majority (84.0 per cent) whom agreed that the board saw itself as a “buffer” between the 
police service and council to ensure police independence. This was important because of the 
significant relationship observed between the board seeing itself as a buffer and responses 
about whether the board effectively buffered [x2 (1) = 38.19, p=.000]. Of those respondents 
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who agreed that the board saw itself as a buffer (n = 62), an overwhelming majority (90.3 per 
cent) also agreed that the board effectively buffered. The reverse was also true with almost all 
cases (91.7 per cent) of those who disagreed that the board saw itself as a buffer (n = 12) also 
disagreed that it effectively buffered. These results strongly suggested that as a precondition 
to a board effectively safeguarding a police service from political interference, it must see 
itself as a buffer.  
 This finding is important for those who work with police boards and is a result which 
challenged the hypothesis given the high ratio of boards in which a council member was the 
chair (49.3 per cent) or a vice-chair (42.7 per cent). Moreover, where a council member was 
the board chair (n = 37), chiefs agreed overwhelmingly (89.2 per cent) that this person 
understood police independence and that the member respected police independence (80.6%).  
 The size of a police board, the term of its members, as well as its legislated mandate 
are important elements of a board’s structure and these variables were, therefore, essential for 
testing the hypothesis. They were not prominent factors identified through the literature 
review and they proved to be generally insignificant here. The exception, however, were the 
significant results arising from a board’s unlegislated and historical mandate as a “political 
buffer” between elected officials and the police. This area was also unexplored in the 
literature, yet evidently warrants closer attention. Instead, the focus for much of the literature 
surrounding police independence, accountability, and governance related to the appointment 
processes to police boards, as well as the role of elected officials vis-à-vis police boards.  
Appointment Processes 
 
 The process for appointing police board members has been historically contentious, 
driven primarily by evidence suggesting that appointments were perceived to be political 
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instead of merit-based (LaLonde and Kean, 2003; Oppal, 1994; Sossin, 2004; Stenning, 
1992). Stenning noted that “most of those persons interviewed… seemed to agree that 
appointments to police boards tend to be “political” in the sense that those who exercise the 
power of appointment are free to exercise their political judgement in the choice of 
appointees” (1992: 453). This observation, however, was faintly supported by the results in 
which only a slight majority (55.4 per cent) of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the 
board appointment process was (political) patronage. For this purpose, the term “political 
appointment” was defined in the survey as “one that applies to an individual who is not 
qualified for the job who is nevertheless appointed on political considerations rather than 
knowledge, skills and experience required” (Watson, 2004: 2). Conversely, chiefs were asked 
if the board appointment process was merit driven. Responses yielded no consensus with 
chiefs agreeing and disagreeing equally (50.0 per cent). For this purpose, ‘merit appointment’ 
was defined in the survey as “one that applies to an individual who is qualified for the job 
based on the knowledge, skills, and experience required.”  
 While beyond the scope and sample size here to determine causality, deeper analysis 
of these results identified interesting and potentially important findings. Foremost, a 
significant relationship was observed between the role of the mayor on the board and how the 
appointment process was perceived by the chief constable. The source of this relationship, 
however, was difficult to discern given the significant relationship existed for both assertions: 
that the process was merit-driven [x2 (4) = 10.12, p=.038] and that the process involved 
political patronage [x2 (4) = 11.29, p=.023]. Accordingly, the varied roles of mayor on the 
board (chair, vice-chair, regular members, and ex-officio) were examined and the results 
raised important questions.   
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 When the mayor was the board chair (n = 21), three-quarters of chiefs perceived the 
appointment process to be merit-driven (76.2 per cent) and only one-third agreed with the 
assertion that it was political-patronage (33.3 per cent). In sharp contrast, when the mayor was 
a regular member (n = 33), chiefs perceived the process as merit-driven in substantially fewer 
cases (42.4 per cent) and, conversely, perceived it to be political-patronage in the large 
majority (75.8 per cent) of cases. While only a small number of cases presented the mayor as 
vice-chair (n = 2) and ex-officio (n = 3), similar results emerged. One explanation for these 
findings may be that mayors occupying the chair or vice-chair position experienced closer 
scrutiny respective to their role in the appointment process and, therefore, they were more 
inclined toward being, and being seen as, merit-driven. Although these results leave to 
question the nature of the relationships observed, they signal a potential problem with 
recommendations made by Oppal (1994) and, subsequently, by Lalonde and Kean (2003) that 
mayors play a more diffuse role on police boards.  
 Through further analyses of chiefs’ perceptions of the appointment processes, one 
statistically significant relationship and another notable, although not significant, relationship 
emerged. The first related to respondents perception of the process as merit-driven with the 
assertion that the board “effectively ‘buffers’ the service to ensure police independence”. 
Among those that agreed that the process was merit-driven (n = 73), an overwhelming 
majority (86.1 per cent) also agreed that the board effectively buffered. Conversely, of those 
that disagreed that the board effectively buffered (n =17), slightly more than two-thirds (70.6 
per cent) perceived the appointment process as something other than merit-driven [x2 (1) = 
3.51, p=.061]. 
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 A second significant relationship was observed between merit-driven appointment 
processes and the perception of municipally appointed members as independent, which was 
defined as “free of political influence and fear of reprisal by council, including termination or 
not being reappointed”. Among respondents who disagreed that municipally-appointed board 
members were independent (n = 24), the majority (70.8 per cent) also disagreed that the 
appointment process was merit-driven [x2 (1) = 6.17, p=.013]. When provincially appointed 
members were analyzed in the same context, the results were nearly the same (71.4 per cent), 
although not statistically significant. A comparison of results from those who perceived the 
appointment process as political patronage did not, interestingly, provide any significant 
relationships or any insight to the above findings. Although these results indicate some 
relationship, the exact nature of that relationship remained unknown and is worthy of further 
research.  
 Comparing and contrasting results involving municipally appointed board members 
with those of provincially appointed board members was expected to reveal widespread 
differences although this was not generally the case. One notable difference was observed 
when comparing the perceived independence of municipal and provincial appointees. While a 
substantial majority (87.9 per cent) indicated that provincial appointees were independent, 
only two-thirds (67.6 per cent) perceived municipal appointees as independent. Disparity in 
the strength of responses was noted as more chiefs strongly disagreed that municipally 
appointed members were independent and, in contrast, more chiefs strongly agreed that 
provincial appointees were independent.  
 The differences observed were likely a consequence of the localized nature of policing 
and police boards. Given that council members typically participate actively in the day-to-day 
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functioning of a police board, municipally-appointed members may be more consistently 
observed and scrutinized by those responsible for their reappointment. Likewise, the 
legitimate interest of a municipal government in board operations and decision-making is 
different and stronger than a provincial government given the localized impact. As a result, 
citizens appointed municipally are more likely to experience conflict or pressure, implicit or 
explicit, as they independently debate important issues with the very council members that 
influence or solely direct the reappointment processes and decisions.   
 Through additional analyses, it was determined that the perception of chiefs about the 
independence of municipal appointees was significantly related to some variables associated 
with police independence. Most relevant, this perception strongly related to the perceived 
effectiveness of the board to “buffer” the service to ensure police independence [x2 (1) = 4.04, 
p=.044]. Although nearly two-thirds (62.5 per cent) agreed that the board effectively buffered 
when municipal appointees were not perceived as independent, a large majority (83.7 per 
cent) agreed when the appointees were perceived as independent.  
 In summary, the chiefs’ perception of the appointment process, as well as the 
independence of municipally appointed board members, significantly related to a number of 
intertwined variables ancillary to police independence. To understand these connections 
better, and to explore more precisely the implications for police, police boards, policy-makers, 
and legislators, a more focused follow-up study is both required and recommended. One area 
that relates directly to this discussion is the role, ratio, and rights of council members in 
relation to the function of police boards.  
Role, Ratio, and Rights of Council Members 
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 In virtually all cases (97.3 per cent), a range of one to six council members sat on the 
police board (n = 75) with one council member on the majority (52.0 per cent) of boards. In 
about one-fifth of cases (22.7 per cent), two council members sat on the board, followed by 
three council members in a minority (10.7 per cent) of cases. Based on the population 
surveyed, police boards were not numerically dominated by council members. Likewise, 
council members rarely (16.4 per cent) occupied half or more of the board seats. In almost all 
instances (90.7 per cent), council members possessed full voting rights as board members. 
 Analyses of the number, ratio, and voting rights of council members with all variables 
associated with political interference and police independence did not reveal any statistically 
significant or noteworthy relationships. Contrary to the hypothesis, chiefs felt independent 
from municipal political interference in ten of the twelve cases where the council members 
occupied half or more of the board seats. In summary, the numbers and ratio of council 
members was inconsequential to police independence, an important finding for those 
interested in adjusting the number of council members on police boards.   
 Another essential test of the hypothesis, the role of elected officials on a board, with 
particular attention to those occupying the role of chair/vice-chair, was analyzed with respect 
to the indicators of police independence. As shown in Table 2, chiefs reported that a council 
member was the chair of the board in nearly half (49.3 per cent) of cases and occupied the 
position of vice-chair almost as frequently (42.7 per cent). The mayor was specifically 
identified as the chair in more than half (56.8 per cent) of these 37 cases, yet was identified as 
the vice-chair in only two cases. 
Table 2: Role of elected officials on the board   
 
 Role on the Board 
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Board Chair 
 
Board Vice-Chair 
Regular 
Member 
 
Ex-Officio 
 
Council Members 
 
49.3% 
(37) 
 
42.7% 
(32) 
 
81.3%% 
(61) 
 
6.7% 
(5) 
 
Mayor 
 
28.0% 
(21) 
 
2.7% 
(2) 
 
44.0% 
(33) 
 
5.3% 
(4) 
 
Noteworthy, of the 21 cases wherein the mayor was the chair, the majority (81.0 per cent) 
were identified as the “de facto chair”, meaning that the mayor’s role as the board chair was 
established through policy or legislation. In all other cases of a council member, including the 
mayor, in the role of board chair, it was determined through a vote by board members. 
 To test any effect between the role of elected officials and police independence, the 
survey explored the frequency of private contacts (by telephone, in-person, or through mail or 
e-mail) about a policing-related matter that a chief received from four groups of people: (1) 
citizen board members; (2) council members on the board, excluding the chair; (3) council 
members in the chair position; and (4) council members not on the board. The size of each 
group varied and this was not quantified as part of the research. Therefore, while the 
frequency of the phenomena within the groups may be reported and compared, this cannot be 
distilled and translated as individual rates.   
 As illustrated in Table 3, chiefs commonly reported being privately contacted by board 
members to discuss policing-related matters. Among the four comparison groups, chiefs were 
most frequently (92.9 per cent) contacted by a council member in the position of board chair 
(n = 42). This finding was expected and is likely an artefact of the legitimate responsibility of 
the chair to be a board’s primary liaison with the chief constable. In contrast, less than two-
thirds (62.7 per cent) of citizen members privately contacted the chief making this group least 
likely to do so.  
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Table 3: Privately contacted chief: comparison by group  
 
# of times within last six months 
Group 0 1-5 6 - 9 10+ 
 
Citizen board member (n =75) 
 
 
37.3% 
(26) 
 
44.0% 
(35) 
 
6.7% 
(5) 
 
12.0% 
(9) 
 
Council member on board, excluding chair (n = 70) 
 
 
25.7% 
(15) 
 
52.9% 
(37) 
 
11.4% 
(8) 
 
10.0% 
(10) 
 
Council member as board chair (n = 42) 
 
 
7.1% 
(3) 
 
57.1% 
(24) 
 
11.9% 
(5) 
 
23.8% 
(10) 
 
Council member not on board (n = 44) 
 
 
24.1% 
(14) 
 
50.0% 
(29) 
 
10.3% 
(6) 
 
15.5% 
(9) 
 
 The most surprising and concerning result was the frequency of private contacts 
reported from council members not on the board. More than three-quarters (75.9 per cent) of 
respondents (n = 44) reported being privately contacted by this group, a figure marginally 
greater than that of council members on the board (73.3 per cent). Although the raw number 
of ‘council members not on the board’ may have been greater than the three comparison 
groups, evidence that these elected officials frequently contacted the chief directly, instead of 
working through the police board, is disconcerting. Such unfettered access to a police chief, 
particularly by elected officials who may be lacking a requisite awareness or appreciation for 
the principle of police independence, is potentially problematic. Accordingly, the perception 
of chiefs about the private contacts from these four groups was tangentially investigated.    
 When asked how independent chiefs felt during private contacts from the four 
comparison groups, some noteworthy, although not statistically significant, differences 
emerged. As Table 4 demonstrates, chiefs almost always (93.1 per cent), on average, felt 
independent when privately contacted by the three ‘board member’ groups (n = 148).  
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Table 4: Felt independent during private contacts: comparison by group 
 
 
Group 
 
Disagree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Citizen board member (n = 54) 
 
 
3.7% 
(2) 
 
53.7% 
(29) 
 
42.6% 
(23) 
 
Council member on board, excluding chair (n = 57) 
  
 
7.1% 
(4) 
 
59.6% 
(34) 
 
33.3% 
(19) 
 
Council member as board chair (n = 37) 
 
 
8.1% 
(3) 
 
45.9% 
(17) 
 
45.9% 
(17) 
 
Council member not on board (n = 54) 
 
11.2% 
(6) 
 
48.1% 
(26) 
 
40.7% 
(22) 
  
 In contrast, only 88.8% felt independent during private contacts with council members 
not on the board (n = 54). Proportionately, this was nearly two-fold the number of chiefs that 
did not feel independent in private contacts with the three comparison groups. However, the 
low number of cases (n = 15) split between the four comparison groups made it impossible to 
infer anything from the findings. Although a focussed follow-up study would provide a more 
robust assessment and understanding about the reported pervasiveness of these council 
members contact with police chiefs, the perception of chiefs in relation to political 
interference from this group revealed another troublesome result.  
 Chiefs were asked to indicate how many times in the last six months they experienced 
political interference from the three applicable comparison groups: (1) council members on 
the board; (2) council member as the chair; and (3) council members not on the board. 
Political interference was explicitly defined in the survey as “direct involvement of political 
authorities (primarily, although not exclusively, at the municipal level) in policing operations, 
as opposed to policy and funding” (Police Sector Council, 2001: 25). As presented in Table 5, 
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nearly one-quarter (24.7 per cent) of chiefs, on average, reported political interference on at 
least one occasion from individuals in each of the three groups in the last six months.  
Table 5: Political interference experienced by chief: comparison by group 
 
Number of times in the last six months  
 0 1-2 3-5 6-9 10+ 
Group      
 
Council member on board, excluding chair  
(n = 73)  
 
74.0% 
(54) 
 
17.8% 
(13) 
 
5.5% 
(4) 
 
0 
 
2.7% 
(2) 
 
Council member as board chair (n = 41) 
 
80.5% 
(33) 
 
12.2% 
(5) 
 
4.9% 
(2) 
 
0 
 
2.4% 
(1) 
 
Council member not on board (n = 72)  
 
73.6% 
(53) 
 
16.7% 
(12) 
 
5.6% 
(4) 
 
1.4% 
(1) 
 
2.8% 
(2) 
 Having regard for the frequency of private contacts that a chief had (Table 3), it 
appeared that the frequency of political interference was relatively low. Among those reported 
(n = 46), interference was most commonly (65.2 per cent) perceived on only one or two 
occasions for each group. Reports of prolific political interference, defined as more than 10 
incidences in the last six months, were observed in each of the three comparative groups 
although these were very rare (2.7 per cent).   
 Noteworthy, however, council members not on the board (n = 72) were cited as 
frequently (73.6 per cent) as those on the board in a position other than chair (74.0 per cent). 
In combination with the previous finding that chiefs were frequently contacted by members of 
this group about policing-related matters, these results raised questions about the extent to 
which police boards safeguard police from political interference from insiders and outsiders. 
At the same time, the results challenged the assertion that by being on a police board, political 
interference by a council member is more likely. 
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 Because cases of political interference offer a portal to assess the affect of board 
structure, the 46 aggregate cases of political interference among the three comparison groups 
(Table 5) were examined in detail. Foremost, this analysis revealed no significant 
relationships with any of the factors that comprised board structure. Refuting the hypothesis, 
board structure did not relate to incidents of perceived political interference. Notwithstanding 
the absence of any significant relationship and the relatively low frequency of incidents, the 
prevalence of reported political interference was, on its own, an important and troublesome 
finding. Accordingly, these cases were analysed in greater detail.   
 Among the 46 cases, 16 chiefs reported political interference from more than one of 
the three groups yielding a net of 30 distinct chiefs (40.5 per cent) who reported political 
interference at least once within the previous six months. Although analysis of the 30 chiefs 
with the variables of board structure did not generally reveal any relationship, there was one 
significant relationship observed between those chiefs who reported political interference by 
any council member and the role of the mayor on the board [x2 (4) = 10.27, p=.036]. While 
the mayor was in an executive role (chair/vice-chair) on less than one-third (29.7 per cent) of 
boards (n = 74), the mayor occupied this role in two-fifths (40.0 per cent) of the cases of 
reported political interference. Given the historical consternation about mayors occupying 
executive roles on police boards, this finding was examined further.    
 As discussed in Chapter One, a mayor in the role of the police board chair is “hotly 
debated” (LaLonde and Kean, 2003: 94). For Oppal, concerns of conflict of interest led to the 
conclusion that, “a mayor would be an inappropriate chair” (1994: B44). According to one 
respondent chief, “Having your chair and vice-chair as political figures and dominant in the 
hiring process for the chief creates obvious pressures for the chief to 'go along’.” Relevant to 
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this result, chiefs were asked how many times in the past 12 months they experienced political 
interference from a council member or the mayor regarding an investigation.7 Because police 
investigations are widely accepted as outside the purview of police governance and a clear 
example of what should be free from political interference, these questions provided two of 
the strongest tests of the hypothesis.  
 As demonstrated in Table 6, chiefs rarely (9.6 per cent) perceived political 
interference from a council member or the mayor regarding an investigation (n = 73). Of the 
aggregate 14 cases in which chiefs reported political interference from a council member 
and/or the mayor, the mayor was in an executive role in only two cases. Likewise, a council 
member was in an executive role in only two other cases. In summary, there was no 
significant relationship resulting from the role of council members, including the mayor, with 
respect to cases of perceived political interference into a police investigation.  
Table 6: Perceived political interference by council and mayor: frequency 
 
Number of times in the last 12 months  
 0 1-2 3-5 6-9 10+ 
Scenario      
 
Political interference from a council member (not 
including the mayor) regarding an investigation.  
(n = 73) 
 
91.8% 
(67) 
 
6.8% 
(5) 
 
1.4% 
(1) 
 
0 
 
0 
 
Political interference from the mayor regarding an 
investigation. (n = 73) 
 
89.0% 
(65) 
 
8.2% 
(6) 
 
0 
 
2.7% 
(2) 
 
0 
  
  As was done with earlier cases of broad political interference, analysis of the 14 cases 
of reported political interference regarding an investigation provided another critical test of 
                                                 
7 Due to a discrepancy in the survey question, it was unclear whether the frequency reported by respondents was 
within the last six months or 12 months. Consequently, the 12-month period was adopted to ensure that any error 
which may result is reflected as an understatement of the actual prevalence.   
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the hypothesis. Among these 14 cases, two chiefs perceived interference from both council 
members and the mayor netting 12 distinct cases within the previous 12 months. Analyses of 
these cases with the variables used to comprise board structure and the appointment processes 
revealed no significant relationships. In contrast to the above finding that there existed some 
relationship between broad political interference and the role of the mayor on the board, there 
was no such relationship identified in this more specific context. In effect, these results 
provided another finding at odds with the hypothesis.  
 It is important to point out that of the aggregate 14 cases of perceived political 
interference from a council member or the mayor regarding an investigation, four did not 
identify political interference elsewhere, as captured in Table 5. Therefore, the number of 
distinct cases of political interference reported totaled 34 and represented slightly less than 
half (45.3 per cent) of the 75 respondents. This finding was the most troublesome within this 
study.    
 As part of a more robust examination of various indicators of political interference and 
police independence, particularly as they related to board structure, chiefs were asked to 
indicate the number of times they experienced “pressure” related to three scenarios: 1) 
pressure from any council member about where or when to deploy police; 2) pressure from 
any board or council member to hire/contract a particular person as a sworn employee; and 3) 
pressure from any board or council member to hire/contract a particular person as a non-
sworn employee. As shown in Table 7, nearly half (47.3 per cent) experienced pressure from 
a council member about where or when to deploy police (n = 74). In contrast, very few chiefs 
(6.8 per cent) reported pressure from any board or council to hire/contract a particular person, 
sworn or non-sworn, as an employee (n = 74).  
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Table 7: Perceived pressure and political interference: frequency 
 
Number of times in the last 12 months  
 0 1-2 3-5 6-9 10+ 
Scenario      
 
Pressure from any council member about where or 
when to deploy police. (n = 74) 
 
52.7% 
(39) 
 
23% 
(17) 
 
17.6% 
(13) 
 
4.1% 
(3) 
 
2.7% 
(2) 
 
Pressure from any board or council member to 
hire/contract a particular person as a sworn 
employee. (n = 74) 
 
91.9% 
(68) 
 
6.8% 
(5) 
 
1.4% 
(1) 
 
0 
 
0 
 
Pressure from any board or council member to 
hire/contract a particular person as a non-sworn 
employee. (n = 74) 
 
94.6% 
(70) 
 
4.1 
(3) 
 
1.4% 
(1) 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 Whether pressure from a council member about the deployment of police was 
reminiscent of the political era and constituted political interference or a threat to police 
independence is debatable. In this context, the deployment of personnel was deemed to be an 
operational matter and, by definition, any involvement of political authorities in policing 
operations was political interference. However, the term “pressure” was not operationalized in 
the survey leaving it to personal interpretation by respondent chiefs. The nature and context of 
perceived “pressure” would be essential to empirically test the concept with any validity and 
reliability. Pressure from a council member about where and when to deploy police yielded 
more significant relationships than any other variable tested. Although these relationships 
were interesting, the absence of an operational definition for the term “pressure” required 
some caution in their interpretation. Notwithstanding, the findings offered another perspective 
in this review and exposed new research opportunities.   
 Among the 35 cases of perceived pressure by council regarding the deployment of 
police, nearly half (48.6 per cent) occurred once or twice in the last year. This perceived 
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pressure by council most significantly related to whether the board saw itself as a buffer 
between the service and council [x2 (1) = 11.31, p=.001] and whether the board effectively 
buffered [x2 (1) = 10.51, p=.001]. Of the 12 chiefs who disagreed that the board saw itself as a 
buffer, all but one (91.7 per cent) perceived pressure to deploy. Likewise, four-fifths (82.4 per 
cent) of respondents who disagreed that the board effectively buffered (n = 17) reported this 
pressure. Similar results emerged in an analysis of this variable with the perception that the 
board understood its legislated mandate [x2 (1) = 4.41, p=.036] and operated within it [x2 (1) 
= 7.11, p=.008]. While three-quarters (75.0 per cent) of those that disagreed that the board 
understood its mandate (n = 12) reported pressure, almost all (88.9 per cent) of the few chiefs 
who disagreed that the board operated within its legislated mandate (n = 9) also perceived 
pressure.  
 The question did not solicit clarification about the relationship of council members to 
the board, nor did the survey enable a comparison of results with non-council members. These 
shortcomings made it impossible to discern the nexus of these relationships, although it may 
be theorized that they were a byproduct of disagreement between police chiefs and boards 
about whether the deployment of personnel was, or should have been, within the purview of 
the police board.  
 Unlike the deployment of personnel, “pressure” from any board or council member to 
hire/contract a particular person as an employee, regardless of whether this person was sworn 
or non-sworn, was widely regarded as unacceptable. This assertion was supported by the 
overwhelming proportion (93.2 per cent) of respondents who reported not experiencing either 
scenario in the last year. Analysis of the 10 aggregate cases determined that two chiefs 
experienced pressure in relation to hiring a sworn and non-sworn employee. The net result 
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was that slightly more than one in ten (10.8 per cent) chiefs reported such an experience in the 
last year. It was interesting to note that of these eight chiefs, six were common to the 30 
distinct cases of political interference by council discussed previously. This finding suggested 
that the isolated results of pressure and political interference revealed in this survey were 
concentrated within the sample and not widely dispersed.    
  The most important result arising from the analysis of these three variables of pressure 
was that none were significantly related to the variables used to comprise board structure. 
This finding was consistent with two previous results which failed to identify any significant 
relationships between variables of political interference and board structure. 
 
Summary 
 
 The results of this research suggested a generally optimistic report on police 
independence in Canada and were personified by the overwhelming majority (94.7 per cent) 
of chiefs who agreed with the statement, “Usually, I feel independent from municipal political 
interference” (n = 74). As additional evidence refuting the hypothesis, this response was 
found to be significantly related to many of the indicators of police independence (Table 8).   
Table 8: Variables of police independence significantly related to question 46 
 
Variable Relationship 
 
Board operates within legislated mandate (n = 75)   
 
[x2 (1) = 15.88, p=.000] 
 
Board effectively buffers the service to ensure police 
independence (n = 74) 
 
[x2 (1) = 6.47, p=.011] 
 
 
Council member (chair) understands the notion of police 
independence (n = 37) 
 
[x2 (1) = 10.56, p=.001] 
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Council member (chair) actively respects police 
independence (n = 36)  
[x2 (1) = 4.66, p=.031] 
 
  
 The responses of chiefs demonstrated remarkable consistency and consensus here and 
throughout the survey. Nowhere else, however, was the consensus as strong as seen by the 
virtual unanimity (98.6 per cent) of chiefs that agreed with the statement, “Usually, I feel 
independent from provincial political interference (n = 74). This response was not, however, 
significantly or strongly related to any of the variables highlighted in Table 8. As discussed 
previously, this is likely an indication that chiefs typically responded to questions from a 
municipal orientation. The noted consistency in these and other responses may be reflective of 
a previously observed homogeneity among the population. In a survey of 162 Canadian police 
executives by the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, a comprehensive profile of police 
executives in Canada led the researchers to conclude:    
The survey respondents demonstrated a remarkably homogenous character 
(with) the uniformity of their characteristics including their general and 
demographic profiles, career paths, responsibilities, strategic visions, attitudes 
to change, values and beliefs, professionalism, ability to balance work and life, 
and strengths and weaknesses (Murray and Alvaro, 2001: 9). 
   
 Ideal Board Structure 
 
 In closing the survey, chiefs were asked questions to understand their perceived value 
of police boards and to solicit their ideas about new models of police governance. The results 
revealed a highly positive view of police boards generally and a surprising level of apparent 
satisfaction with current police board models. Specifically, an overwhelming majority (92.0 
per cent) of chiefs indicated that the police board “added value to their police service and/or 
community’. Moreover, 89.3% of respondents took the extraordinary step of explaining their 
response, the results of which are detailed in Appendix D. As a summary, the remarks were 
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very positive with most referring to the board as supportive, knowledgeable, serving as a link 
to community, a buffer for independence, and providing governance and oversight. Notably, 
only a minority of comments were critical or offered suggestions for change.    
 Chiefs were also asked to outline the ideal board structure using the current model of 
Canadian police boards. As demonstrated in Table 9, the majority (56.5 per cent) identified a 
board comprised of five members as ideal, although there was lower consensus regarding the 
exact composition including the number of municipal and provincial appointees, as well as 
the role of council members on the board.                                                                                                                              
Table 9: “Ideal” board structure: most common responses8  
 
# of 
Board 
Members 
(n = 67) 
# of 
Municipal 
Appointees 
(n = 68) 
# of 
Provincial 
Appointees 
(n = 63) 
# of 
Council 
Members 
(n = 68) 
 
Council Member 
Role 
(n = 69) 
 
Council Member 
Rights 
(n = 68) 
 
5 - 56.5% 
 
7 - 27.5% 
 
6 - 10.1% 
 
 
2 - 33.8% 
 
1 - 29.4% 
 
3 - 22.1% 
 
2 – 33.0% 
 
1 – 27.0% 
 
3 - 23.8% 
 
0 - 7.9% 
 
2 - 52.9% 
 
1 – 25.0% 
 
3 - 19.1% 
 
Chair                20.3% 
 
Vice-chair          4.3% 
 
Reg. member    68.1% 
 
Ex-officio           7.2% 
 
 
Voting       92.6% 
 
Non-voting  7.4% 
  
 By comparing the “ideal” structure with the current structure of police boards (Table 
1), no significant differences emerged. Conversely, analysis of each area revealed a highly 
significant relationship between the number of board members that chiefs currently reported 
to and the number of members on the ideal board [x2 (30) = 241.97, p=.000]. Similarly 
significant results emerged from an examination of most other relevant variables, including 
number of municipal appointees [x2 (30) = 113.58, p=.000], provincial appointees [x2 (25) = 
                                                 
8 Percentages may not equal 100% as the results shown represent common responses and may not be exhaustive.  
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107.66, p=.000], and council members on the board [x2 (9) = 65.65, p=.000]. With the notable 
exception of changes in the role of council members on the ideal board, such a significant 
relationship among most responses signaled confidence among chiefs about their current 
board structure. Alternatively, the responses reflected a lack of contemplation or awareness 
among chiefs about the merits of different board models.   
 Notwithstanding the significant relationships observed, a number of nuanced 
differences are worth highlighting as they may infer how chiefs perceived particular board 
members or board member roles. With respect to the number of board members, nearly two-
thirds (64.0 per cent) reported to a board of five, although this size was ideal for a smaller 
majority (56.5 per cent). Accounting for differences in response rates, it appeared that almost 
one in five (19.0 per cent) chiefs with a five-member board (n = 43) did not identify this as 
the ideal size. Interestingly, an increase was noted between the number of chiefs who had a 
board of six people (n = 2) and those who identified this as the ideal size (n = 7). In summary, 
many chiefs advocated that the ideal board size is something other than what they reported to. 
 More substantive differences were observed in relation to the number of municipally 
and provincially appointed citizens on the board. While a slight majority (52.0 per cent) of 
chiefs reported one municipally appointed citizen on their board, less than one-third (29.4 per 
cent) identified this as ideal. Instead, chiefs more commonly (33.8 per cent), albeit only 
marginally, suggested that the ideal board included two municipally appointed citizens. 
Another notable difference was observed between the number of boards with no provincial 
appointees (19.2 per cent) and the number of chiefs who considered zero provincial 
appointees to be ideal (7.9 per cent). Instead, respondent chiefs (n = 63) most commonly (33.0 
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per cent) advocated for two provincial appointees on an ideal board or, in slightly fewer (27.0 
per cent) cases, one provincial appointee.    
 An unexpected finding emerged from the nearly unanimous (97.0 per cent) support for 
at least one council member on the ideal board (n = 68), a position contrary to Oppal’s 
recommendation that “municipal councillors not serve as members of police boards” (1994: 
B-65). Almost equally (92.6 per cent) supported was the position that council members on the 
ideal board possess full voting rights, a notable reflection of the overwhelming majority (90.7 
per cent) of boards whose council members had voting rights.  
 Consensus was less apparent, however, when determining how many council members 
should be on an ideal board. Here, a slim majority of chiefs (52.9 per cent) suggested two, a 
result mirrored by the majority (52.7 per cent) of respondents whose current boards had two 
council members. However, there were noticeable differences between the responses of chiefs 
whose current board had one or three council members. Whereas 11 chiefs indicated that their 
current board had one council member, 17 chiefs indicated that this was ideal. Conversely, 
whereas 20 chiefs reported three council members on their board, only 13 suggested this as 
the ideal. Form the perspective of chiefs it is, therefore, apparent that an ideal board include 
only one or two council members.  
 While chiefs strongly favoured council members on the board in-principle, there was a 
substantial difference in the role of board members on the ideal board when compared to the 
current board. Whereas council members sat as the chair in almost half of cases (49.3 per 
cent) and the vice-chair in nearly as many (42.7 per cent), only one-fifth of chiefs (20.3 per 
cent) envisioned the ideal board structure to include a council member as the chair and almost 
never (4.3 per cent) in the role of vice-chair. Instead, approximately two-thirds (68.1 per cent) 
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favoured council members in the more limited role of regular board member. Unlike all 
previous comparisons on this issue, where there was a strong relationship between chiefs’ 
current board structure and their ideal model, chiefs fundamentally departed from the status 
quo when referring to the role of council members. This departure may be inferred as 
evidence supporting the contention of Lalonde (2003) and others (Griffin, 2006; Oppal, 1994; 
Police Sector Council, 2001) that the issue of the mayor being the chair of the police board is 
widely contested.  
 Imagining a New Model 
 
 Chiefs were asked to think beyond the current model of Canadian police board 
structures and imagine a different model that would protect police independence, while not 
compromising police accountability and public confidence. In contrast to previous open-
ended questions, only a minority (14.1 per cent) of chiefs responded. Once again, this may be 
interpreted as an indicator of general satisfaction among chiefs about the current state of 
police board structures. Alternatively, this result may indicate that chiefs had not 
contemplated the affect of police board structure, were unaware of any strengths and 
weaknesses inherent to varying structures, or simply viewed board structure as unrelated to 
any problems they perceived. Of the responses received, most chiefs provided ideas that 
reflected only a tinkering with the existing models, rather than sweeping reform. These 
responses advocated change relating to board composition, appointment processes, and 
accountability structure, as well as how and how much training board members receive. The 
complete list of responses is presented in Appendix E.                                                                                                                                                                                                           
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Chapter Four: Conclusion and Recommendations 
 The independence of police from political interference is fundamental to democracy 
and there exists an historical persistence for the use of police as a political apparatus of the 
state. Yet, there is also an “equally unsettling history of police agencies acting as a law unto 
themselves” (Sossin, 2004: 30-31). An examination of the relationship between the police and 
the state exposes the enduring challenge presented by the seemingly dichotomous doctrines of 
police accountability to the state and autonomy from the state. How to guard against one 
extreme while not inviting the other is of utmost importance in a liberal democracy.  
 As a central figure in the network of regulatory bodies and processes which mediate a 
complex and delicate relationship between the state and police, municipal police boards 
facilitate police accountability and independence simultaneously. The first police boards 
emerged to “insulate the police from direct governance by elected municipal politicians and 
guarantee a measure of political independence for police services” (Public Sector Council, 
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2001: 25). Despite a rich history, including substantial change to their membership and 
authority (Biro, 2006), boards have maintained apparently political structures while their 
precise role and very existence continues to be a matter for debate (Law Commission of 
Canada, 2006).  
The research literature details the important role of police boards amidst a complex 
backdrop of historical, constitutional, legal, and practical challenges. Foremost, police and 
crime are inherently political (Bayley, 1970; Estrada, 2004; Goldsmith, 1991; Haggerty, 
2004). Governments are almost always elected with a specific ‘law and order’ agenda and 
campaign pledges often have a direct impact on police (Sossin, 2004). Crime is strategically 
cast as a problem to be solved through political action amidst an environment where “nobody 
(politicians) can afford to be viewed as being ‘soft on crime’” (Estrada, 2004: 421).  
These academic assertions were observed over the two-year course of this research 
during which a new conservative federal government established crime and safety as an 
urgent national priority, and the first-ever civilian commissioner was politically and 
controversially appointed to manage the RCMP amidst a report that the organization had 
“governance and cultural problems” (Browne, 2007: 39). Elsewhere, the mayoral-election of 
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan was fought, in part, on a pledge to remove elected officials from the 
local police board, while the need to establish a police board was publicly and extensively 
debated in Winnipeg, Manitoba.  
These fundamental shifts and policy debates highlighted the need and importance for 
research on police governance. Empirical research, however, is conspicuously absent. The 
literature is comprised mostly of commentary among academics, practitioners, and pundits 
about the state of policing and police governance in Canada. Accordingly, the breadth of 
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literature reviewed in this major paper was atypically comprehensive and is a contribution to 
the dearth of current information on police governance.  
An historical review of policing paradigms, often referred to as “eras”, demonstrated a 
persistently political relationship between the police and the state. Despite the introduction of 
police boards 150 years ago with the intent to “remove the police from direct political 
control” (Law Commission of Canada, 2006: 85), Canadian commissions of inquiry over the 
past 30 years have consistently demonstrated the elusiveness of this objective. To 
contextualize the relationship between the police and state, considerable attention was paid to 
disentangling the notions of police “independence” and “accountability”. Though much of the 
discourse on police governance presented these doctrines as dichotomous, the more recent 
literature suggested a tempered perspective. Combating the idea that independence was the 
antithesis of accountability, the relationship appeared to be competitive, yet compatible.         
 A further contribution of this study was the empirical testing of an important 
hypothesis. The hypothesis was that the more inherently political a police board structure, as 
defined by its size, composition, appointment processes, and particularly the ratio, role, and 
rights of elected officials on the board, the less independent the police service would be, as 
reported by the chief constable. At the root of the hypothesis was an untested question about 
whether police boards were structurally more or less susceptible to control by elected 
officials, and whether such susceptibility manifested itself as political interference intruding 
on police independence. This research assessed the extent to which the manifest function of a 
police board as a “buffer” between police and state was related to its structure. The findings of 
the study revealed a number of noteworthy “blind spots” in police governance, yet, most 
significantly, the results refuted the main hypothesis.   
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This study reaffirmed previous research concluding that there was no dominant model 
of police boards in Canada (Stenning, 1992). Contrary to the hypothesis, board size, legislated 
mandate, the number, ratio, and single-term length of municipal and provincial appointees, as 
well as the number, ratio, and voting rights of council members on the board did not 
significantly relate with any of the indicators of political interference and police 
independence. For policy makers and legislators interested in protecting police independence 
or improving police governance in Canada, these results should narrow the scope of structural 
reforms from those previously advocated. A number of insightful relationships were observed, 
however, and each shed light on an issue that requires additional monitoring, deeper empirical 
exploration, and/or immediate policy and legislative reform. 
This study also reaffirmed a previous observation that there was considerable 
consistency in the legislated mandate of police boards (Canadian Association of Police 
Boards, 2006), with the exception that slightly less than half were responsible for civilian 
complaint oversight. A significant relationship was noted between police boards with this 
responsibility and chiefs not feeling independent when making policy decisions. This 
relationship was likely a byproduct of the operations/policy framework that guides the 
purview of police boards. This type of framework is generally problematic because operations 
and policy, like police independence and accountability, are neither mutually exclusive nor 
dichotomous. Instead, the relationship between these notions is more dynamic and this is 
particularly true where the police board is responsible for civilian complaint oversight. New 
ways of thinking about these concepts are emerging in the literature (see Roach, 2004; Sossin, 
2004) and should be carefully considered by police executives and governors alike. In the 
interim, the lack of independence felt by police chiefs reporting to a board that is responsible 
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for civilian complaint oversight may signal either a healthy tension in these circumstances or 
another problem inherent to the oft-debated structure and mechanics of civilian complaint 
oversight in Canada today.  
In the quest to understand the structure of police boards and its relationship with 
indicators of police independence, a number of results suggested that how and how well a 
police board interpreted and internalized its mandate was significant. Although the role of 
“political buffer” is the raison d’être of police boards, it is not acknowledged or supported in 
policy or legislation. Given the historical persistence of politics in policing, which was again 
affirmed in this research, it is evident that it should be. By formally acknowledging the role of 
“political buffer” and, by extension, the reality that political interference in policing is 
pervasive, additional policy and legislation could be created to structure processes for 
resolving allegations of interference in policing, including better protection for individual 
police board members from political dismissal without cause. To this end, Oppal 
recommended that “board members should be removable during terms only for cause” and 
that, “board members whose terms are not renewed be provided with written reasons within 
30 days of request” (1994: B-70). These recommendations are supported here.  
Notwithstanding the absence of such protections today, police boards and board 
members must assume greater responsibility in the pursuit of police independence given that 
nearly half (45.3%) of the police chiefs surveyed revealed political interference from a 
council member/mayor in the last year. An additional 12 chiefs reported pressure from a 
council member about where or when to deploy police, producing an aggregate 46 of 75 
respondents (61.3 per cent) that perceived political pressure or interference at least once 
within the last year. This finding was the most troublesome of the study and was a sharp 
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signal from chiefs that politics continued to permeate policing despite the presence of police 
boards, a finding that was widely and historically supported by the literature (Griffin, 2006; 
LaLonde and Kean, 2003; Oppal, 1994; Police Sector Council, 2001; Sossin, 2004; Stenning, 
2004).  
 Typical of early efforts to empirically explore any subject, the findings invited several 
new avenues for study and research. Further empirical exploration should augment this study, 
provoke debate, and advance conversations that shape police governance operations and 
policy. Foremost, a focussed follow-up study of municipal police chiefs is required to more 
thoroughly understand and test the troublesome findings here. Specifically, in-person 
interviews or focus groups with chiefs would provide an essential context to the findings of 
this research of frequent municipal political interference and political pressure to deploy 
resources. Of particular importance is the need to discern whether these reports were evidence 
of the historical ebb and flow of serious political interference in policing or, alternatively, 
whether they were an artefact of heightened political sensitivity among today’s police chiefs 
and/or an artefact of a nuanced shift in the threshold of what they interpret as political 
interference. Methodologically, a replication of this study with municipal police chiefs who 
report to a committee-of-council would provide an important comparison group that, 
augmented by a survey of police board members, would provide valuable perspectives to test 
the veracity of these results.  
 There were numerous factors which significantly related to the chiefs disclosure of 
political pressure and interference. Often at issue in discussions of political interference in 
policing are the number, ratio, and role of elected officials with respect to the police board, 
including the appointment process to the board. Unexpectedly, the number, ratio, and role of 
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council members on the police board did not significantly relate to any of the indicators of 
political interference used in this study. Police chiefs almost unanimously supported having at 
least one council member on the board, which spoke highly of their perceived contributions. 
However, a high ratio of chiefs also proposed a more limited role for elected officials on 
police boards and this suggested an undercurrent of dissatisfaction.  
 Chiefs agreed overwhelmingly that council members in an executive role on the board 
understood and respected police independence. Moreover, there was no relationship found 
between the role of council members on a police board and the indicators of political 
interference. Notwithstanding, the assertion of many chiefs that elected officials should 
occupy a more diffuse role on police boards was troublesome. The underlying source of this 
consternation, however, was unclear. It may be a principled position that boards should be 
independent, non-partisan, and a “political buffer”, or may signal some other phenomena 
among elected officials in executive police board positions which were not detected through 
this study.  
 From a pragmatic perspective, council members regularly experience role conflict as 
police board members when voting on matters relating to budget, for example. How these 
situations are managed by the council members and the effect on board policy/operations and 
police independence is conspicuously absent in the discourse of police governance. While the 
findings of this study should quell the periodic calls to remove council members entirely from 
police boards, it is apparent that a more focussed review of their role on police boards is 
necessary.    
 Most contentious in relation to the role of elected officials on police boards is the 
specific role of a mayor (LaLonde and Kean, 2003; Oppal, 1994). On this subject, two 
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findings emerged in this study which brought focus to the otherwise broad assertion that 
mayors and police boards are a poor mix. Foremost, the role of a mayor on a police board did 
not directly and significantly relate to the indicators of police independence. Unexpectedly, 
the appointment process to police boards was more likely to be seen as merit-driven when the 
mayor was the board chair. Conversely, the process was more often seen as political 
patronage when the mayor was a regular member. This was not to suggest a causal 
relationship and these results challenged any argument that boards were more politically 
predisposed when the mayor was the chair.  
 The perception among police that the appointment process to police boards is political 
patronage rather than merit-based is well-documented (LaLonde and Kean, 2003; Oppal, 
1994; Sossin, 2004; Stenning, 1992). As the first empirical study of this question, chiefs 
presented a much more divided view, however, which suggests that the existing literature 
overstated their perception. Chiefs were split equally when asked if appointments were merit-
driven, while only a slight majority perceived the process as (political) patronage. The 
dissonance may be a function of assumption or general scepticism about appointments by 
political bodies or a byproduct of high profile instances of political patronage which tend to 
shape opinions.  
 Although chiefs appeared to have a more balanced view of the appointment process 
than reflected in the literature, it was equally clear from the results that a problem remained.  
Particularly acute for municipal governments, only two-thirds of their police board appointees 
were perceived by chiefs as politically independent compared to nearly all provincial 
appointees. Noteworthy, this perception was directly related to the length of a municipal 
appointee’s single term and related strongly to the chiefs’ perception of the board as an 
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effective buffer. Of particular interest to policy-makers and legislators, board members with 
terms of three or more years were more likely to be perceived as politically independent and 
effective as a political buffer.  
 To enhance the credibility of the municipal appointment process, Oppal recommended 
that short-listed applicants to a police board be interviewed “in public by council about their 
qualifications and their views about policing” and that unsuccessful candidates be provided 
with “written reasons upon request why they were not recommended for appointment” (1994: 
B-61). In principle, these recommendations are supported here. However, a municipal 
government would be better served by establishing an independent nominating committee, 
comprised of citizens and city employees, to screen police board applicants in a manner 
consistent with the processes used for appointments to judiciaries and Canada’s National 
Parole Board. Augmented by legislation that sets police board member terms at three years, 
these measures will enhance procedural fairness in the process and produce a level of 
transparency, accountability, and credibility that does not currently exist.   
 The results of this study revealed another “blind spot” in police governance which 
related to the experience of police chiefs with council members not on the police board. 
Foremost, the survey found that council members not on the board frequently contacted the 
chief privately about policing matters, rather than communicating through the police board. 
More concerning was that chiefs were slightly less likely to feel independent during these 
private contacts and marginally more likely to report political interference from council 
members not on the board than those on the board. Unfettered access by elected officials to 
the chief, particularly by people who may be lacking a requisite awareness or appreciation for 
the principle of police independence, is troublesome. To address this, it is recommended that 
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police boards contemplate the legitimate police-related needs of elected officials and establish 
appropriate mechanisms to meet these. Moreover, it is recommended that all newly elected 
municipal council members receive training in the areas of police independence and 
governance.    
 This research offers a timely contribution to the paucity of knowledge surrounding 
police governance in Canada. The results exposed serious blind spots in police governance 
which, unabated, present a real threat to police independence. In particular, the pervasiveness 
of reported political interference and pressure on police chiefs raised several significant issues 
which must be explored jointly by academics and practitioners and subsequently addressed by 
policy-makers and legislators.  
 Although some of the results reported here were both alarming and pressing, they 
should not obscure what was otherwise a very positive current state of police independence 
and police governance in Canada. The first pan-Canadian study of its kind in more than 20 
years, this study stands as a testament to the willingness of the Canadian Association of 
Chiefs of Police, Police Sector Council, and Royal Canadian Mounted Police to support 
empirical research which, though politically sensitive, contributes to better police governance 
in Canada. Most importantly, chiefs reported feeling independent when making operational 
decisions, a hallmark of appropriate police/state relations in a liberal democracy. Equally 
assuring was the virtual unanimity among chiefs who agreed that they “usually” felt 
independent from municipal and provincial political interference. Overall, chiefs of municipal 
police services across Canada signalled a general satisfaction with, and confidence in, the 
structure and operation of police boards today. These outcomes will surely be welcomed by 
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the many paid and unpaid professionals dedicated to policing and police governance 
excellence in Canada.
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Appendix A: Survey Instrument 
The purpose of this survey is to examine the relationship between Canada’s 
varied police board structures and the experience of Chief Constables. This 
research, the first of its kind in Canada in more than 20 years, will provide 
critical information about police governance to Canadian police chiefs, boards, 
and policy-makers.    
 
The study is being conducted by Darren Caul, a former police board member, in 
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in 
Criminology and Criminal Justice from the University College of the Fraser 
Valley (UCFV). This research is being conducted in partnership with the UCFV 
Centre for Criminal Justice Research and is endorsed by the Canadian 
Association of Chiefs of Police (CACP) and the Police Sector Council.  
 
This survey is being administered to more than 150 municipal police chiefs 
across Canada. Your participation is entirely voluntary. Confidentiality is 
assured at every step in the research process, including the final published 
report, to provide you with the greatest opportunity to answer candidly. 
Accordingly, please do not provide any personal information / identifiers on 
this document.  
 
Questions may be directed to Darren Caul at (780) 437-9975 or via email at 
drcaul@shaw.ca. Please contact Yvon Dandurand, Associate Vice President of 
Research and Graduate Studies at UCFV, at (604) 864-4654 if you have any 
concerns with this research. 
 
The survey will take approximately 15 minutes to complete and may be returned 
via regular mail using the self-addressed, postage-paid, envelope provided.  
 
Receipt on or before May 16, 2008 is appreciated. 
 
 
A copy of the final report, expected to be published in fall 2008, will be 
available on the CACP and Police Sector Council websites. Should you wish to 
receive an electronic copy, please send an email to drcaul@shaw.ca. 
   
 
 
- Thank you, in advance, for your time to complete this survey! - 
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TERMS USED 
 
 
? Service refers to the police organization of which you are the Chief 
Constable.  
 
? Board refers exclusively to the police board / commission that you report 
to. 
 
? Board Members refer to individuals, elected and appointed, on the 
Board. 
 
? Council refers to the municipally elected body that the Board relates to. 
 
? Legislation refers to the provincial police Act governing the Service and 
Board. 
 
? Police independence refers to“freedom from partisan political 
influence(Law Commission of Canada, 2006: 85).” 
 
? Political interference refers to “direct involvement of political authorities 
(primarily, although not exclusively, at the municipal level) in policing 
operations, as opposed to policy and funding.”  
 
? Patronage appointment is “one that applies to an individual who is not 
qualified for the job but who is nevertheless appointed based on political 
considerations rather than the knowledge, skills and experience required.” 
 
? Merit appointment is “one that applies to an individual who is qualified 
for the job based the knowledge, skills and experience required.”  
 (Watson, 2004: 2)   
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PART I – STRUCTURE 
 
1. How many Members are on your Board? |____| 
 
2. How many citizen Board Members are appointed by Municipal Council? |____| 
 
3. How long is a single term of municipally appointed Board Members? |____| yrs  
 
4. How many Board Members are appointed by the provincial government? |____| 
 
5. How long, if applicable, is a single term of provincially appointed members? |____| yrs 
 
6. How many Council Members are on the Board? |_____| 
 
7. How is the position of Board Chair determined?  
 
1.  Board vote   ?      
2.  Mayor is de facto Chair  ?      
3.  Other _____________________________________________ 
 
Roles and Voting Rights of Council Members on the Board: 
    
8. What is / are the role(s) of Council Members on the Board? (check all that apply)   
 
1.  Chair     ?      
2.  Vice-Chair   ?      
3.  Regular Member  ?      
4.  Ex-Officio   ?        
 
9. What are the voting rights of Council Members on the Board? (check all that apply)   
 
1.  Voting Member(s)  ?      
2.  Non-voting Member(s) ?      
 
10. What is the role of the Mayor on the Board? (Please check one) 
 
1.  Chair      ?      
2.  Vice-Chair   ?      
3.  Regular Member  ?      
4.  Ex-Officio   ?        
5.  N/A      ?  
 
11. What are the voting rights of the Mayor on the Board? (Please check one) 
 
1.  Voting Member  ?      
2.  Non-voting Member  ?  
3. N/A      ?    
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PART II – MANDATE 
 
12. Please check all responsibilities that the Board is legislatively responsible for.   
1.  Determine adequate personnel levels ?  
2.  Budget for needs ?  
3.  Monitor budget ?  
4.  Hire Chief of Police ?  
5.  Review performance of Chief    ?  
 
6.    Collective bargaining  ?  
7.    Civilian complaint oversight ?  
8.    Policy setting for Service  ?  
9.    Priority setting for Service  ?  
10.  Other ______________________
All remaining questions relate to your personal experience as a Canadian Chief Constable. 
 
  Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
13. 
 
The Board understands its legislated mandate. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
14. The Board operates within the purview of its 
legislated mandate. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
15. The Board sees itself as a “buffer” between the 
Service and Council to ensure police 
independence. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
16.  The Board effectively “buffers” the Service to 
ensure police independence.   
    
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
 
PART III – APPOINTMENT PROCESSES 
 
  Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
17. 
 
The Board appointment process is merit 
driven.  
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
18. The Board appointment process is (political) 
patronage. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
19. Municipally appointed members are 
independent; free of political influence and 
fear of reprisal by Council, including 
termination or not being reappointed. 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
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  Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
20.  Provincially appointed Members are 
independent; free of political influence 
and fear of reprisal by the provincial 
government, including termination or not 
being reappointed.  
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
PART IV – YOUR EXPERIENCE 
 
21. How long have you been the Chief of this Service? |____|____|____| months  
 
22. How long was your predecessor the Chief?  |____|____|____| months 
 
23. How would you characterize the nature of your predecessor’s departure?  
  
               (Please check all that apply) 
1. Successfully completed contract    ?        
2. Applied for contract renewal unsuccessfully    ?    
3. Voluntary Retirement       ?  
4. Involuntary “Retirement”      ?  
5. Contract was terminated before expiration   ?  
6. Pressured to resign by Council before contract expiry ?  
7. Pressured to resign by the Board before contract expiry ?  
8. Other (please explain):
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
_________________________         ________________ 
 
24. Since April 1998, how many Chiefs have there been, including you? |____|____| 
 
25. Apart from operational decision-making, what degree of independence from the Board do 
you have for making decisions about the direction, policing orientation, human resources, 
and other management matters of your service?             
                        (check one) 
1. I make virtually all of the major organizational decisions and  ?  
 report infrequently to my Board.       
2. I refer all major organizational decisions to my Board    ?  
 for approval.   
3.   I refer all major organizational decisions to my Board    ?  
 for its information.  
Other (please explain): 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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  Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
26. I feel independent when making operational 
decisions. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
27. I feel independent when making policy 
decisions. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
 
28. In the last SIX months, have you ever felt that you were being given an “Order” from an 
individual Board Member, other than the Chair or his / her designate?       
 
1. NO   ?       Go to question 30 
2. YES      ?  
 
29. If yes, please indicate the position of the person and the number of times this has 
occurred in the last six months.  
 
  # of times in the last SIX months 
 
1. 
 
Citizen (non-Council) Board Member 
 
 
1-2 
 
3-5 
 
6-9 
 
10+ 
 
2. 
 
Council Member on the Board 
 
 
1-2 
 
3-5 
 
6-9 
 
10+ 
 
3. 
 
Council Member not on the Board 
 
 
1-2 
 
3-5 
 
6-9 
 
10+ 
 
 
Citizen (non-Council Member) Board Members:  
 
30. In the last six months, how many times were you privately contacted (by telephone, in-
person visit, or personal mail/e-mail) about a policing-related matter by a citizen Board 
Member, other than the Chair?  
 
0 ?         1-2 ?        3-5 ?       5-9 ?              10+ ?  
 
 
  Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
31. 
 
I felt independent during these private contacts. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
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Council Members on the Board, excluding the Chair: 
 
32. In the last six months, how many times were you privately contacted (by telephone, in-
person visit, or personal mail / e-mail) about a policing-related matter by a Council 
Member on the Board?  
 
0 ?         1-2 ?        3-5 ?       6-9 ?              10+ ?  
 
  Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
33. 
 
I felt independent during these private contacts? 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
 
34. In the last six months, how many times did you experience political interference from a 
Council Member on the Board? 
 
0 ?         1-2 ?        3-5 ?       6-9 ?              10+ ?  
 
 
 
The next section applies only to those for whom the Board Chair is an elected official 
(including Mayor). If this does not apply, please skip to question 43. 
 
 
Council Member (including Mayor) as the Board Chair:  
 
35. In the last six months, how many times were you privately contacted (by telephone, in-
person visit, or personal mail / e-mail) about a policing-related matter by this Council 
Member?   
 
0 ?         1-2 ?        3-5 ?       6-9 ?              10+ ?  
 
  Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
36. 
 
I felt independent during these private contacts. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
 
37. In the last six months, how many times did you experience political interference from 
this Council Member (Chair)?   
 
0 ?         1-2 ?        3-5 ?       6-9 ?              10+ ?  
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  Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
38. This Council Member (Chair) understands the 
notion of police independence. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
39. This Council Member (Chair) actively respects 
police independence.  
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
40.  This Council Member uses the position as Board 
Chair to advance Council’s political agendas.  
    
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
41.  This Council Member uses the position as Board 
Chair to advance personal political agendas. 
  
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
 
Council Members not on the Board: 
  
42. How many times in the last six months were you privately contacted (by telephone, in-
person visit, or personal mail / e-mail) about a policing-related matter by a Council 
Member not on the Board?   
 
0 ?         1-2 ?        3-5 ?       6-9 ?              10+ ?  
 
  Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
43. 
 
I felt independent during these private contacts. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
44. In the last six months, how many times did you experience political interference from a 
 Council Member not on the Board?   
 
0 ?         1-2 ?        3-5 ?       6-9 ?              10+ ?  
 
 
PART V: OTHER 
 
45. In the last six months, how many times have you experienced each of the following?  
 
  # of times in the last 12 
months 
1. Pressure from any Council Member about where or 
when to deploy police.  
 
 
0 
 
1-2 
 
3-5 
 
6-9 
 
10+ 
2. Pressure from any Board or Council Member to hire /  
contract a particular person as a sworn employee. 
 
 
0 
 
1-2 
 
3-5 
 
6-9 
 
10+ 
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3. Pressure from any Board or Council Member to hire / 
contract a particular person as a non-sworn employee.  
 
 
0 
 
1-2 
 
3-5 
 
6-9 
 
10+ 
4. Political interference from a Council Member (not 
including the Mayor) regarding an investigation? 
 
 
0 
 
1-2 
 
3-5 
 
6-9 
 
10+ 
5. Political interference from the Mayor regarding an 
investigation? 
 
 
0 
 
1-2 
 
3-5 
 
6-9 
 
10+ 
 
 
PART VI – SUMMARY 
 
  Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
46. Usually, I feel independent from municipal 
political interference. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
47. Usually, I feel independent from provincial 
political interference. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
 
PART VII – YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
48. Are there other threats to police independence not addressed in this survey?  
 
1. NO   ?       Go to question 49 
2. YES      ?     (please explain) 
 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
49. Does the Board add value to your police service and / or the community?  
 
1. NO   ?      (please explain) 
2. YES      ?     (please explain) 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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50. Using the current model of Canadian Police Board structures, what would the ideal 
structure look like to equally ensure police independence and accountability? 
 
# of 
Board 
Members 
# of 
Municipal 
Appointees 
# of 
Provincial 
Appointees 
# of 
Council 
Members 
Council          Member 
Role  
(select one) 
Council 
Member Rights  
(select one) 
 
 
 
    1. Chair                     
 
2. Vice-Chair    
 
3. Regular Member  
   
4. Ex-officio              
 
?  
 
?  
 
?  
 
?  
 
 
 
 
A. Voting        ?  
 
B. Non-Voting?  
 
 
51. Thinking beyond the current model of Canadian Police Board structures, can you imagine 
a different model that would better protect police independence, while not compromising 
police accountability or public confidence?  
 
1. NO   ?         
2. YES      ?     (please describe) 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Thank you for completing this confidential survey! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
?  Please use the self-addressed, stamped envelope 
 provided to return the survey! 
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Appendix B: Letters of Endorsement/Support 
Letter from Police Sector Council – on letterhead 
 
April 28, 2008 
 
Dear Chief: 
 
Re:   Support for research: Municipal Police Governance in Canada: An Examination of the 
Relationship between Board Structure and Police Independence  
 
On behalf of the Police Sector Council, I am pleased to provide this letter of support to Darren 
Caul who, in partial fulfillment of a Master of Arts in Criminology and Criminal Justice, is 
surveying Chiefs from all municipal police services in Canada.  
 
This research serves to explore your perception and experience as it relates to relationships 
between police board structure and police independence – an important and timely issue. 
Research of this nature is rarely conducted, and will advance our understanding of current 
policing issues as well as our collective effort to strengthen police governance in Canada.   
 
The impact of this research is entirely dependent on response rates. Your contribution is 
critical and I ask for your support by taking the time to candidly complete and remit the 
confidential survey prior to the deadline.   
 
Thank you, in advance 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
Geoff Gruson 
Executive Director 
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Letter from Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police - on Letterhead 
 
 
February 20, 2008 
 
 
Subject: Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (CACP) – Support of Thesis 
 
Mr. Caul: 
 
In reference to your correspondence dated January 4, 2008 concerning your thesis, ‘Municipal 
Police Governance in Canada: An Examination of the Relationship between Board Structure 
and Police Independence’, be advised that your correspondence was tabled with the CACP 
Executives on January 13, 2008. 
 
It was moved by the Executives that the CACP support in principal your research topic and 
survey of Police Executives. 
 
The CACP wishes you success with your thesis and we look forwarded to a copy of the final 
paper. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
Peter Cuthbert 
Executive Director 
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Appendix C: Pre/Post Survey Letters Sent to Participants 
Pre-Survey Letter Sent to All Participants on UFV Letterhead 
 
 
April 21, 2008 
 
Re:   Survey of Canadian Municipal Police Chiefs on April 28, 2008   
 
 
Dear Chief:    
 
The relationship between police agencies, police boards/commissions, and local Council is 
both important and delicate, yet police governance in Canada has rarely been studied. My 
name is Darren Caul and I am a former police board member currently completing a Master 
of Arts in Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University College of the Fraser Valley. I 
am researching the relationship between Canada’s varied police board structures and the 
experience of Chiefs.   
 
Next week, you will receive a confidential survey mailed to your personal attention. This 
research is the first of its kind in Canada in more than 20 years, and is being administered 
nationally to more than 150 municipal police chiefs. Conducted in partnership with the UCFV 
Centre for Criminal Justice Research, the survey is formally endorsed by the Canadian 
Association of Chiefs of Police (CACP) and the Police Sector Council.  
 
The survey passed UCFV ethical review and is completely confidential. All data collected 
will be aggregated and results will not identify an individual, police service, community, or 
province. All data collected will be destroyed upon completion of the research. Finally, the 
survey has been carefully crafted knowing that your time is valuable and will take 15 minutes 
to complete.   
 
I hope that you will take the time to contribute to this important and timely study of police 
governance in Canada. The final report, expected in fall 2008, will be made available for 
dissemination to the CACP and the Police Sector Council. If you would like to receive an 
electronic copy, this too may be arranged.   
 
Should you have any questions about this research, I may be contacted directly at (780) 437-
9975 or via email at drcaul@shaw.ca. Any concerns may be directed to Mr. Yvon Dandurand, 
Associate Vice President of Research & Graduate Studies, at (604) 864-4654. 
 
In advance, your time to complete the survey on or before May 16, 2008 is appreciated!    
 
Sincerely, 
 
D.R.Caul 
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Darren Caul, M.A. candidate  
Post-Survey Letter Sent to All Participants on UFV Letterhead 
 
 
May 05, 2008 
 
Re:   Survey of Canadian Municipal Police Chiefs Deadline on May 16, 2008   
 
 
Dear Chief:    
 
Last week, a copy of the Canadian Municipal Police Chief survey was mailed to your 
personal attention. If you did not receive this survey, please email me directly at 
drcaul@shaw.ca to receive an electronic version immediately. 
 
This survey is the first of its kind in Canada in more than 20 years and is being administered 
nationally to more than 150 municipal police chiefs. Conducted in partnership with the 
University College of the Fraser Valley (UCFV) Centre for Criminal Justice Research, the 
survey is in partial fulfillment of a Master of Arts in Criminology and Criminal Justice. This 
research is formally endorsed by the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (CACP) and 
the Police Sector Council.  
 
The survey passed UCFV ethical review and is completely confidential. Only aggregate data 
will be used in the final report and the results will not reveal the identity of an individual, 
police service, community, or province. All data collected will be destroyed upon completion 
of the research. The final report, expected in fall 2008, will be made available for 
dissemination to the CACP and the Police Sector Council. If you would like to receive an 
electronic copy, this may be arranged.   
 
The ability of this research to produce results which are meaningful and influential for you is 
entirely dependent on return rates. The survey has been carefully crafted knowing that your 
time is valuable and will take 15 minutes to complete. If you have already done so, thank you! 
If not, your time to complete the survey and return it in the postage-paid envelope is greatly 
appreciated on or before May 16, 2008.  
 
Should you have any questions about this research, I may be contacted directly at (780) 437-
9975 or via email at drcaul@shaw.ca. Any concerns may be directed to Mr. Yvon Dandurand, 
Associate Vice President of Research & Graduate Studies, at (604) 864-4654. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
D.R.Caul 
 
Darren Caul, M.A. candidate  
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Appendix D: Does the Board Add Value? 
         
 
Governance: 
? Governance and oversight; board is very involved in three-year business planning.                                                                                                      
? Board has been directly involved with service's strategic planning process 
? Board has more time and experience to focus on police/policy issues.                                                         
? Provides civilian oversight and credibility regarding police leadership/integrity. 
? Strategic and business planning also done together. 
? Keeps police focused on strategic priorities which are aligned to budget and policy 
which board is responsible for.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Accountability / Civilian Oversight:  
? Gives reality to perception that police have an oversight body.                                                              
? Accountability of police is imperative.  
? Our board adds a very good balance of oversight and governance.                                                                                                                
? Civilian governance is required in a democracy.                                                                                                                                      
? The board can have significant value supportive/non-supportive, merit and integrity, 
accountability to both the service and the community.  
? Perception of civilian oversight.                                                                                                                                                 
? Civilian oversight is the basis for accountable policing in this country.                                                                                                                                   
? Provides the civilian governance/oversight outlined in the police act.                                                                                                                                            
? Mainly in the area of optics of civilian oversight.  
 
Independence / “Buffer”:   
? The board provides a buffer between city council and the service. 
? The board provides the critical independence from the political sphere, without which 
the potential for corruption would rise ten fold.  
? They reflect the community and can be a buffer from political decisions. 
? Without the board and police act, council would interfere constantly with policing.                                                  
? They fight for independence, but to date have been unable to obtain same.                                                                            
? The dominance of elected officials inevitably leads to a loss of independence and a 
constant battle of wills.                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
? Keeps the police service independent and informed on tax payers views.                                                       
? The board deflects negative public response to necessary police silence during an 
investigation.                                                                                                                                                      
? Acts as an excellent facilitator/mediator between police independence and council's 
interests/interactions with policing services.                                                                                                                                                                                   
? Assists in maintaining police independence.   
? Keeps the independence of police separate from council while still making the chief 
and the organization accountable.  
? They ensure there is no political interference, provide civilian oversight, and represent 
the community. 
? Not political in decision making. 
? The board also is responsible for the budget so the community is more accepting of 
increases when they are proposed by them.                                                                                                        
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Community Representatives / Communication Link: 
? Act as Liaison, report services to citizen group and community.                                                                                                          
? Gives the community, through both elected and appointed board members, a say in 
determining how they are policed. 
? The board does provide the community with some representation, which in turn allows 
them the access that they don't think they have otherwise.  
? A resource for citizens and council to discuss policing issues. Support for police 
agency and achieving community desired policing level.                                                                       
? Very active in "Community Policing Initiative" ideas.                                                                                                                                                   
? Board has been a rubber stamp for community.  
? The chief and board hold a good working relationship, have similar values and 
expectations of service to be provided, and both encourage community feed back.                                              
? Provides for community input. 
? By serving as a liaison between the public/citizen and the police department.                                                        
? Board is seen as representative of the general population.                                                                                  
? At best, the board is a great resource and a venue for community input.   
? Community representation.                                                                                                                                                                                   
? The board does add value to an agency. Our board members play a very important role 
in our community and are the external ears and eyes of our agency. They help 
contribute valuable information to our service. We all work together to offer the best 
product that we can to meet our community needs.                                                                             
? Members represent community well.                                                                                                           
 
Supportive:  
? Our Board is generally supportive. They communicate the positives about policing.  
? Well informed and backs up our police service.                                                                                                                                      
? Very supportive and experienced.                                                                                                                                                          
? Very supportive.                                                                                                                                                                                
? An excellent cross section of the community who show interest in improving the 
community.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
? Our board seems to want to enhance policing in our community.                                                                
? Provides an important link to our community.                                                                                                                                                                                            
? Respected members on the board assist with public and council support of the police 
service.                                                                                                                                                  
? Very supportive of the department.                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
? Strong support for increasing sworn and civilian complement to heavy workload.                                                                                                         
? They assist and work with us to support our needs. 
 
Advocacy: 
? Avoids reporting to council on matters relating to budget and reporting; Also, there is 
a buy-in budget process (mayor/deputy mayor sit on board).                                                                         
? Connected. 
? Well plugged in and went to work for betterment of public safety. 
? Ambassadors for police service. 
? Also add as strong advocates before council for budget approvals.                          
? Crucial to resource needs and operational funding.                                                                           
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Knowledgeable / Perspective:  
? They are our sounding board. They are arms-length from council and serve taxpayers 
interests.    
? Provide historical continuity and advise based on knowledge of people and previous 
incidents.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
? Very committed board members. They are knowledgeable and provide a good 
sounding board for the chief.  
? Individuals outside policing have fresh perspectives.                                                                                              
? They offer different points of view and also pass on complaints from the public.                                                                         
? Different perspective - civilian oversight.                                                                                                                    
? Provides varying viewpoints.                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
  Other / Miscellaneous:    
? The Board is very happy with the service provided.   
? Much better compared to being governed by a committee of council.                                                            
? A well-functioning and well-intentioned board.   
? Very respectful towards the police force and its members.                                                                                                                                                                    
? The board and I enjoy mutual respect for each other and work closely together to 
address social issues.                                                                                                                             
? The board does respect their role and wants to provide a good service. Through my 
years of experience, the board has respected my advise on policy issues.                                                                                                                                      
? Legitimate democratic.                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Areas of Concern / Complaint:                                                                                                                              
? Don't work as team/attempted to replace police service. Has no working relationship 
with police association.                                                                                                                             
? Policing should have a stand-alone board not reporting directly to elected officials.                                               
? Political turnover. 
? Very few decisions are required of board; most community doesn't know it exists.                                             
? Police mandate development is questionable.                                                               
? Practically speaking they are often encouraging and supportive verbally but don't do 
enough in educating themselves and council on the realities in policing.                                                                                        
? The board does not have to have decision making. It is at a political level.  
? However, the majority of the board does not understand their roles and 
responsibilities. We meet once a month and they vote on matters that they truly do not 
understand from a policing perspective. They relate back to their own experience or 
jobs.     
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Appendix E: Imagining a Different Board Structure: Responses 
 
Composition: 
  
? I don't think the mayor should be a member of the board nor do I think retired police 
officers should be members. A member of council by all means.                                                                         
? Increase the citizen appointees at the expense of provincial appointees, the latter tend 
to be patronage position. 
? If the board is comprised of only local residents they will have a tendency to just look 
at policing issues from a narrow perspective. Policing issues are much broader in 
nature and as such requires board members to be much more open-minded about the 
pressures of policing in their communities. Without understanding their roles they will 
bring their own perceptions into question and this brings conflict, which is not good 
for anyone! 
 
Appointment Processes: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
? Direct election of local community residents would be one alternative or an interview 
process to appoint all community members with no political appointments.                                                                                                                                                                
? Board members should not all belong to one political party.     
? I prefer a model that includes a council/citizen composition for police governance.                                          
 
Board Member Training:  
 
? (The board’s) success and failures will be directly proportional to its understanding of 
its powers and roles and its ability to work collaboratively with its partners in the 
community.                                                      
? Boards should be required to take mandatory governance training prior to assuming 
the role.   
 
Accountability Structure: 
 
? It may be more effective to have police departments report to a provincial oversight 
body, like the director or commissioner of police services division, and still retain 
autonomy, with anecdotal reporting to city council, who will invariably influence but 
not direct police operations     
? I do not agree with police chiefs reporting to a city manager.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Other: 
? A model where an arbitration process is established to resolve disagreements between 
boards and elected officials.  
? Present system we are using does work effectively however at times our members at 
large do feel frustrated or left out. Council members on the board quite often have 
made a decision prior to the police commission meeting.                       
